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Choosing ancestry is a serious business with major implications.'
- Robert Cover
Each of us is entirely free to find his history in other places than the pages
of the United States Reports.2
- Mark DeWolfe Howe




Nomos and Narrative (N&N) is often recognized as an originary text in the
field of Law and Literature.4  At the time of its publication in 1983, its
configuration of law as merely one form of narrative--one that exists within a
normative universe constituted by a multiplicity of narratives-was received by
many readers as a powerfully original contribution to legal theory. In the
twenty-plus years since then, scholars have continued to cite N&N for its
insistence that law cannot be reduced to rules and for its reminder that
"preceptual" law must be understood as only one contributor to the governing
normativity that in fact constitutes the real universe in which we, as individuals
and groups, construct the meanings of our lives.
N&N has received renewed attention as the subject of books and law
review articles during the last several years. In 1997, Carolyn Heilbrun and
Judith Resnik, in an essay including its authors' joint and separate
contributions, noted the striking absence of any "serious contemplation of
women' 6 on law school reading lists and recommended the definition of a "new
canon"7 for Law and Literature courses, in which N&N might be included .
1. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1983).
2. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5 (1965).
3. SUSAN HOWE, MY EMILY DICKINSON 7 (1985).
4. See GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 164 (2000)
(identifying N&N as an instance of early "hermeneutic criticism of law").
5. See generally NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha
Minow et al. eds., 1995); Symposium: Rethinking Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 17 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 1 (2005).
6. Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, in BEYOND
PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW, LITERATURE IN THE UNITED STATES 11, 38 (Jacqueline St. Joan & Annette B.
McIlheney eds., 1997) (reprinting Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature,
and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990)).
7. Id. at 31.
8. Id. at 41.
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Resnik specified that the "new canon" should differ from the original canon
both in content and in method: "different texts" should be included; already-
included texts should be "read differently." 9 On the basis of an assessment that
N&N had "turned" toward and "helped to lead the way - to the examination of
the lives of women and minorities," 10 Resnik identified N&N as an important
text, regretting that it had not "made [its] way onto the reading lists" of Law
and Literature courses."1
In 2005, Resnik offered further commentary on N&N. While venturing to
criticize some of Cover's arguments and attempting to supplement N&N by
"taking up" some gender-related issues that Cover did not address when he
wrote in 1983,12 Resnik does not retract her earlier, highly-positive
characterization of N&N and its relevance for Law and Literature. In spite of
the concerns she had earlier expressed, 13 Resnik forgives, or perhaps excuses,
N&N's failure to address gender issues, characterizing that failure as an effect
of its author's "generational" identity. 14  Noting that Cover belonged to a
generation more focused on the problem of race discrimination than that of sex
inequality, Resnik proposes that N&N offers a level of "guidance, wisdom and
insight" that "transcends" these generational conflicts, assuring its continuing
relevance 5 and, presumably, its claim to canonicity.
The notion of "canonicity" has been problematized during the last decades,
in legal theory as well as in broader critical approaches.' 6 As has the notion of
"gender."' 7 But I understand Resnik, in her advocacy of a "different canon," to
be making two arguments. First, she is arguing for "different writings"-
urging that the body of writing that receives attention from Law and Literature
scholars should include more writing by women. Secondly, she is arguing that
"different readings"--that is, readings done differently-need to be
undertaken. My argument here is with Resnik's strong endorsement of N&N as
an example of the "different" writings and readings that she wants to see. I
once shared Resnik's positive assessment of N&N as inviting more consciously
9. Id. at 11, 31-32.
10. Id. at41.
11. Id. Heilbrun and Resnik reference Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: An
Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Liberal Arts Component of the Law School Curriculum, 23 VAL. U.
L. REV. 267 app. 1 (1989), which notes "Law and Literature Courses Offered at Thirty-Eight ABA
Approved Law Schools." Gemmette updated her survey of Law and Literature course offerings in 1995.
Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class Action, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 665
(1995) [hereinafter Gemnmette, Law and Literature].
12. Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert
Cover (An Essay on Racial Segregation at Bob Jones University, Patrilineal Membership Rules, and
Jurisgenerative Practices), 17 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 17 (2005).
13. See generally Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6.
14. Resnik, supra note 12, at 53.
15. Id.
16. See HAROLD BLOOM, THE WEsTERN CANON 37 (1994) (using the term "canon" while at the
same time noting that "no secular canon is ever closed").
17. See JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004).
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gendered perspectives in law and legal theory. 18 In my re-reading, however, I
have come to recognize that N&N actively excluded important and relevant
writings by women (the kinds of "different writings" that Resnik wants to
include in her "new canon"), which would have unsettled N&N's confident
valorization of religious groups. 19 I have come to recognize also that N&N
neither constitutes nor identifies the kind of "different reading" of legal and
literary texts that might energize future projects of Law and Literature
commentators. 20 My concern is that an insufficiently critical approach to N&N
and a continuing willingness to overlook the limitations of its reading method
will contribute to a dangerous diversion away from precisely the kinds of
"different reading" that might be useful to future developments in Law and
Literature.
While my perspectives in this writing are more critical and more
cautionary than Resnik's, I do write with great respect for Robert Cover's
personal history and with respect for the personal and working relationship that
Resnik shared with him. In this Article, I want to respond to Resnik's call for
"different writings" by introducing to Law and Literature the work of Susan
Howe, an American poet and literary critic, a contemporary of Robert Cover,
and the daughter of the man I consider to be Cover's "intellectual father": Mark
DeWolfe Howe. 21 Susan Howe is a writer who has received major national and
international recognition but has not drawn the attention of the Law and
Literature movement. Beyond introducing Susan Howe's work as "different
writing," I want to identify it as embodying and enabling deeply "different
reading" of a kind that holds promise for legal theory in general and for Law
and Literature in particular at the present moment, in which urgency and crisis
surround issues of law and religion. To accomplish both of these ends, I re-
read N&N here, through the critical lens(es) of Susan Howe.
Like Robert Cover's work, Susan Howe's writing addresses American
religious history as well as literature and law. Unlike N&N, Susan Howe's
work explicitly concerns itself with the treatment of gender and with gendered
antinomianism in American religious history and American literature-
something that Cover, in spite of his focus on the antinomian narratives of
religious groups, ignored. In N&N, Cover analyzed the intersection at which
civil law is confronted and challenged by the narratives of religious groups.
22
18. Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1129, 1148-1149 (1987) [hereinafter Ashe, Feminist Jurisprudence].
19. See infra Section II.B.2 for discussions of the writings of Carol Weisbrod and of Carol Gilligan.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See Talisman Interview, with Edward Foster, in SUSAN HOWE, THE BIRTH-MARK: UNSETTLING
THE WILDERNESS IN AMERICAN LITERARY HISTORY 155, 161 (1993) [hereinafter Talisman Interview].
See infra Section II.B.3 for a discussion of Mark DeWolfe Howe as Cover's intellectual father; like
Cover, Mark DeWolfe Howe wrote extensively in the domain of American legal history relating to
religion.
22. The "paideic communites" Cover valorized were, typically, religious groups. See infra notes
45-46 and accompanying text.
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In re-reading N&N today, it becomes important to assess whether Cover's work
can enable analyses of the intersections at which law and narrative and
religious groups and gender-all together and all at once, with increasing
visibility and increasing intensity-collide. Resnik's recent article reflects a
recognition that N&N did not account for such complex intersections. 23 Susan
Howe's focus on precisely such complex intersections distinguishes her work
from Cover's and makes it more relevant and useful in the face of present
challenges.
The content (what she reads/writes) of Susan Howe's work is more
encompassing and more relevant than that of N&N. Beyond that, the method of
Susan Howe's reading/writing is very different from that of N&N. That
method, which makes Susan Howe's work more theoretically relevant for
current legal theory, involves Susan Howe's brave venture into an historicized
location-one not readily characterized as modem or post-modem, and one
unquestionably not pre-modem. In that space beyond the reach of
multiculturalism, individual antinomian voices that are not merely "different"
but that are barely legible (in religion, in literature, and in law) begin to be un-
covered. In that space, Howe contributes to contemporary thought her own
refusal to avoid the uncertainties exposed and activated when those uncovered
voices sound.
.Part I of this Article provides a brief summary of the content and coverage
of N&N--of its treatment of law, of religion, of narrativity; of the values of
each of these; and of the relations among the three. Part I notes the positive
value that Cover attributes to the narratives of religious groups because of their
jurisgenerative potential, as well as his advocacy for the constitutional
protection of religious groups' autonomy. Part II considers the gendered
genealogical themes and the intellectual kinship connections through which
Cover develops the arguments of N&N, exploring the relationships that Cover
claims for himself-and the ones that he rejects-as he locates his commentary
within a broad range of work in law and in other disciplines. Uncovering the
unconscious male-gendering that marks N&N, this Part explores the identities
of the writers whom Cover introduces as his intellectual kin and considers the
identities and the work of his overlooked, or minimally-mentioned, female
contemporaries. Part II speculates about the possible motivation for and the real
effects of Cover's gender exclusivity and argues that this exclusivity
significantly limits the relevance of N&N for contemporary legal theory,
particularly for considerations of law, narrative, and religion in their
intersections with gender.
Part !I1 discusses writings of Susan Howe published from the mid-1980s
to the present, identifying some of the features that contribute to the power and
originality of her theoretical undertakings. Susan Howe's works address
23. Resnik, supra note 12, at 47.
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N&N's subject matter-law, narrativity, and religion; at the same time, they
explicitly attend to issues of gender and they employ sophisticated theoretical
perspectives. In these latter respects Susan Howe's works differ significantly
from N&N and, indeed, constitute a radically "different" method of
reading/writing. Part III's discussion of Susan Howe's work-about American
law, about American literature, about American religion and about gender-is
offered in the hope that readers may find inspiration in it, recognizing in it a
deep and true capacity to, in Cover's much-cited phrase, "stop circumscribing
the nomos."24 Part III argues that "learning Howe"--that is, reading Howe in
dialogue with N&N and with Cover-generates new possibilities and new
directions for the continuing study of law's engagement with narrativity, with
religion, with gender, and with every unconverted antinomianism.
Part III presents the most expansive treatment of the implications of Susan
Howe's work. However, I have attempted to incorporate, throughout this
Article, what I have learned from my reading of Howe. For that reason, I have
invited her writing, in the forms of forceful interruption and of insistent and
sometimes peremptory challenge, into my own text. Fragments from Susan
Howe's writings appear throughout this Article; they are recognizable by their
appearance in this font.
I. LAW AND RELIGION IN NOMOS AND NARRATIVE
Robert Cover's Nomos and-Narrative appeared in 1983 as the Foreword to
the Ijarvard Law Review issue surveying the 1982 Term of the United States
Supreme Court. Published at a time when Cover was already well-known for
his study of judicial acquiescence to-or collusion with--"the injustices of
Negro slavery," 25 N&N emerged onto a scene in which legal theory had already
begun to be marked by significant new directions. N&N followed by eight
years the deeply critical perspectives expressed in Roberto Unger's Knowledge
and Politics, a major originary text of the Critical Legal Studies movement,
26
and it followed by ten years James Boyd White's publication of The Legal
Imagination.27 Focused, like White's book, on the nature of the processes that
give rise to "legal meaning," N&N consciously situated itself by reference to
White's Legal Realist writing.28
Nomos and Narrative was received as a startling contribution because of its
strong configuration of law as only one form of narrative within a universe of
narrativity and also because of its urgent insistence that law must be understood
as a narrative forged by a multiplicity of groups and associations that produce
24. Cover, supra note 1, at 68.
25. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS xi (1975).
26. ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
27. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
28. See Cover, supra note 1, at 6 n.10.
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alternative contending narratives and contending nomoi. N&N laid bare the
violence of statist law29 and of the "jurispathic" nature of judging, and it
seemed inspiriting in its optimistic invitation for new narratives able to
challenge that violence. N&N involved a new attention toward hermeneutics,
an early gesture in the "turn toward interpretation" 30 that would come to
characterize much of the most original legal scholarship that would develop
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.3 1 While N&N transmitted its Legal Realism
heritage, it also openly manifested a literary and religious sensibility
attributable to Cover's own life experience. The "energy and vitality" of the
essay, noted in Robert Post's recent comments on N&N,32 are attributable in
large measure to the individuality and singularity of Cover's voice. My voice
formed from my life belongs to no one else.33
While N&N introduces a survey of the Supreme Court's 1982 Term, most
of the essay is in fact dedicated to Cover's own theoretical enterprise. Its eight
concluding pages offer critical evaluation of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bob Jones University v. United States;34 however, its other fifty-six pages are
devoted to expansive considerations of the concepts of "nomos" and
"narrativity" and to commentary illustrating the relationships between those
concepts. Cover begins N&N not with any preliminary account of the
provenance of the term "nomos," but with the broad proposition: "We inhabit a
nomos - a normative universe." 35 He further posits that the "formal institutions
of the law" are "but a small part of the normative universe ... ,36 This
"normative universe" is the central object of investigation in N&N. Cover
explicitly states that his interest reaches beyond the narrower and more limited
hermeneutical projects taken up by other scholars who have examined "the
problem of 'meaning' in law." 37  Instead, Cover defines his own work as
29. This theme was further developed in Cover's later writing, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
L.J. 1601 (1986).
30. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 251 (1985).
31. It will be argued, in Part III, infra, that N&N did not itself deploy the strategies that would
become broadly apparent in American jurisprudence during the decade after its publication, when
Continental deconstructive practices had already given rise to critical theory in various disciplines of the
humanities in American universities, and when those practices became visible to legal theorists.
32. Robert C. Post, Who's Afraid of Jurispathic Courts?: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos
and Narrative, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 9 (2005).
33. HOWE, supra note 3, at 13.
34. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
35. Cover, supra note 1, at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5 n. 11, citing William R. Bishin & Christopher D. Stone, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD (1972). Cover distinguishes his effort from the work
of Bishin and Stone. He also makes clear that he will undertake a project different from the work of
Hans-Georg Gadamer, which he regards as having--disappointingly--understood "legal hermeneutics"
as a narrow or limited project. Cover, supra note 1, at 5 n.l 1, citing Hans-Georg Gadamer, TRUTH AND
METHOD (Garrett Barden & John Cumming trans. 1975). Cover notes:
The entire discussion of legal hermeneutics in Truth and Method is disappointingly
provincial in several ways. First, it is entirely statist and therefore does not raise the question
of the hermeneutic problems particular to all systems of objectified normative texts (statist
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"indebted" to that of James Boyd White, whose projects he characterizes as
having begun a more inspiring exploration of "the range of meaning-
constituting functions of legal discourse." 38  It is the grace of
scholarship. I am indebted to everyone.39
In perhaps the best-remembered contribution of N&N, Cover expounds
upon the general concept of "jurisgenesis," or "the creation of legal
meaning, a process that can occur in the absence of any state. It is here that
Cover explains the origins of the term "nomos": "The Hebrew word Torah was
translated into the Greek nomos in the Septuagint and in the Greek scripture
and postscriptural writings, and into the English phrase 'the Law.' 4 1 It is at
this point, perhaps, that we begin to sense why the word "nomos" had seemed
so strangely both familiar and unfamiliar. As Cover widens his focus to
include religion, we are reminded of the centrality of issues of "nomianism" to
American religious history and of the Antinomian Controversy, which divided
the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the seventeenth century and culminated in the
banishment of Anne Hutchinson.42 rDliscourse in the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, religious or otherwise, stirred by millenarian
activism, fraught with Duzzlement and rapture, fury and
passivity, was charged with particular risks for women, who
were hedged in by a network of old-world property values.
Charged: "But now having seen him which is invisible I fear not
what man can do unto me" said Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at her
Examination at the Court at Newtowne/Canbridge. 43
Cover makes clear that when he uses the term "nomos" he intends to
invoke its most extended meaning, referring "to law in the sense of a body of
regulation and, by extension, to the corpus of all related normative material and
to the teaching and learning of those primary and secondary sources. In this
fully extended sense, the term embraces life itself, or at least the normative
dimension of it .... 44 Cover proposes that a nomos may exist in two forms.
and nonstatist alike). But it also inadequately addresses the question of the destruction of the
hermeneutic in the necessarily apologetic functions of officialdom.
Cover, supra note 1, at 5 n. 11. See generally BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 4.
38. Cover, supra note 1, at 5, citing WHITE, supra note 27, and James White, Law as Language:
Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV 415 (1982).
39. SUSAN HOWE, THE BIRTH-MARK: UNSETrLING THE WILDERNESS IN AMERICAN LITERARY
HISTORY 39 (1993).
40. Cover, supra note 1, at 11.
41. Id. at I In.31.
42. The classic work on this topic is THE ANTrINOMIAN CONTROVERSY 1636-1638: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (David D. Hall ed., 1968). A very recent new and related work is PURITANS
IN THE NEW WORLD: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (David D. Hall ed., 2004).
43. HoWE, supra note 39, at 3.
44. Cover, supra note 1, at II n.3 1. Cover notes that his broad interpretation of "nomos" will
parallel the broad meaning given to the term "Torah" in "later rabbinics." Id. Tapping into Mishnaic
text, Cover provides an account of interpretations of obligations of Judaic law offered by Simeon the
Just; these are invoked to illustrate and support the proposal that the nomos is characterized by the
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A nomos can be seen as "paideic," or "world-creating," when it involves
communities that are marked by strong personal commitments, by the
education of the community's members into a common corpus of "law" that
includes both precept and narrative, and by 'a sense of direction or growth that
is constituted as the individual and his community work out the implications of
their law."45 Religious communities may be "paideic" communities.46 On the
other hand, a nomos may be "world-maintaining" rather than "world-creating."
The "world-maintaining" nomos will be characterized by universal norms
enforced through institutional discourse premised on objectivity, by weak
interpersonal commitments, and by minimalist obligations-obligations just "to
refrain from the coercion and violence that would make impossible the
objective mode of discourse and the impartial and neutral application of
norms."47 The civil community exemplifies such a "world-maintaining" nomos.
Unlike the "world-maintaining" civil community, paideic communities are
radically unstable; processes of interpretation that occur within them give rise
to "juridical mitosis" as multiplicities of meaning are generated.48 Sometimes
paideic communities will expel or exile members whose interpretations of the
community law are felt to be too disruptive, and Cover reminds us of this,
49
though he does not discuss the phenomena of expulsion and exile. Anne
Hutchinson was banished by the founders of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony. then murdered in the natural wilderness by
history.5° The "sober imperial mode of world maintenance"-the nomos of
the civil community-is needed to maintain social stability in the face of
unstable paideic communities.
In dynamic relationship with the supporting or competing narratives of
paideic communities, the civil community will seek to bolster its own stability
by claims of authority; but such authoritative claims, Cover insists, are suspect.
In illustration of this point, Cover notes that Americans do not share "an
authoritative narrative" about the significance of the Constitution.51 Early
narratives of conversion and first captivity narratives in New
England are often narrated by women.... During a later Age of
Reason eighteenth-century Protestant gentlemen signed the
Constitution in the city of Philadelphia. These first narratives
from wide-open places re-place later genial totalities. 2 Further,
coexistence of a corpus of law, discourse about that corpus, and interpersonal commitments to it. Id. at
12.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 13 (stating that the law of Torah constitutes paideic nomos, as does the community that
Christians refer to as "the Church").
47. Id.
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id. at 16 n.41, 23 n.66.
50. HOWE, supra note 39, at 4.
51. Cover, supra note 1, at 17.
52. HowE, supra note 39, at 50.
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even if it were possible to define an authoritative history, the relationships of
individuals to that history would be disparate. With regard to the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments, for instance, "Some of us would claim Frederick
Douglass as a father, some Abraham Lincoln, and some Jefferson Davis.
Choosing ancestry is a serious business with major implications. 53 Cover does
not identify any other parents or precursors whom we might claim in
"choosing" our nineteenth-century ancestry. He will, later in N&N, mention
William Lloyd Garrison as a radical abolitionist,54 but there will be no mention
of the nineteenth-century narratives of Harriet Beecher Stowe, of Susan B.
Anthony, of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, of Matilda Joslyn Gage, of Emily
Dickinson, or of any other woman. "My Life had stood - a Loaded Gun
-" was written during the Civil War. Emily Dickinson, who is so
often accused of avoiding political issues in her work, certainly
did not avoid them here. As she well knew, the original
American conflict between idealism and extremism was being
acted out again. John Brown was another Puritan zealot invoking
Jehovah, set out to fight the Lord's battle, the Bible's way.
Liberators and the righteous were, as always, burning, looting
and destroying. 5
Cover also illustrates his propositions about "law-creation" in paideic
communities through an examination of "legal ordering" that focuses on the
relatively pure, pre-statist form in which such ordering occurred in Jewish
communities whose governing norms included Biblical texts.56 Within paideic
communities, acts of prophecy and claims of revelation may present powerful
challenges to existing orders, he notes, and stories of precept-violation will
raise problems of political legitimacy."
53. Cover, supra note 1, at 18.
54. Id. at 35-40.
55. HowE, supra note 3, at 74.
56. Cover finds in the Biblically-documented paideic communities a "thickness of legal meaning"
produced where "precepts and narratives operate together to ground meanings," Cover, supra note 1, at
19, and he explores the tensions that become evident when challenges to the existing precepts are
developed. Illustrating those tensions, Cover points to the contradictions that are recorded between, on
the one hand, the preceptual law stated in Deuteronomy and, on the other hand, the acceptance of
violation of the precepts expressed in other Biblical narratives. Id. at 19-21.
57. In the course of this account of how even a "single self-enclosed world...produces a system of
normative meaning," Cover, supra note 1, at 19, and how narratives sometimes support the overturning
of preceptual law, Cover states that stories of precept-violation suggest that a "bearer of destiny" may be
able to support his transgression of precept through elaboration of a narrative that characterizes that
transgression as divinely ordained. Id. at 22. When such an event occurs, it becomes possible that the
"objective, universalized norm" may cease to operate. Id. at 23. Acts of prophecy and claims of
revelation typify challenges to existing orders, and stories of precept-violation raise problems of political
legitimacy. Id. at 22-24. Cover notes: "Every legal order must conceive of itself in one way or another
as emerging out of that which is itself unlawful." Id. at 23. And "[tihe return to foundational acts can
never be prevented or entirely domesticated. ... [Bliblical narratives always retained their subversive
force-the memory that divine destiny is not lawful." Id. at 24.
Some of the themes raised by Cover appear to anticipate ones that would later be more
radically explored by Jacques Derrida, in his reading of Walter Benjamin. Jacques Derrida, Symposium,
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Having outlined this theoretical understanding of the relationship of nomos
to narrative-and of both to religion-Cover develops that theory more fully in
application to events in American law. There are .. .characteristic
North American voices and visions that remain antinomian and
separatist. In order to hear them I have returned by strange
paths to a particular place at a particular time. a threshold at the
austere reach of the book.58 Relying heavily on briefs filed on behalf of
the Mennonites in Bob Jones University5 9 and on briefs filed on behalf of Old
Order Amish communities in Wisconsin v. Yoder, Cover explores how "legal
meaning" develops in the "insular communities" constituted by particular
religious groups, and he explores the tensions that arise when the nomos of an
insular group contradicts or challenges the nomos of the civil government. This
discussion is relevant to Cover's critique of Bob Jones University because he
configures the concerns of the Amish and Mennonite paideic communities-
their interests in religious freedom and in education-as very much akin to
those asserted by Bob Jones University in its challenge to the IRS ruling that
denied its tax-exempt status.
61
According to Cover, Bob Jones University, at the times relevant for review
by the IRS and during the United States Supreme Court's 1982 Term, practiced
race discrimination through its policy of forbidding "interracial dating,
interracial marriage, the espousal of violation of these prohibitions, and
membership in groups that advocate interracial marriage., 62 In spite of his
personal record of activism and scholarly work dedicated to the Civil Rights
63movement, Cover acknowledges and accords great significance to the First
Amendment constitutional claims-involving rights of "free association" and
rights of "religious liberty"-asserted by Bob Jones University. He criticizes
what he sees as an act of avoidance by the Court: its failure to engage
adequately, or even respectfully, with those claims asserted by a religious
64
group.
. Pursuing his interest in the origin of legal meaning, Cover first directs his
attention to texts that provide the self-narratives of particular religious
Force of Law: The "Mystical" Foundation of Authority, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1990) (Mary
Quaintance, trans.). For discussion of this connection between Cover and Derrida, see Marie Ashe,
Limits of Tolerance: Law and Religion after The Anti-Christ, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 587, 599 (2003)
[hereinafter Ashe, Limits of Tolerance].
58. HowE, supra note 39, at 2.
59. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of
Church of God in Christ, Mennonite, Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (No.
81-03).
60. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 12, Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (No. 70-110).
61. Cover, supra note 1, at 60-68.
62. Id. at 62.
63. See Robert A. Burt, Robert Cover's Passion, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1-4 (2005) (discussing
Cover's work with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) during the 1960s).
64. Cover, supra note 1, at 67.
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communities. 65 First: the Law holds gibberish off. 66 Thus, he quotes
from the Amicus Brief filed by the Mennonites on behalf of Bob Jones
University67 and from the Brief filed for the Old Order Amish in the Yoder
case. These Briefs constitute the narratives of lawful religious groups; they
are not the narratives of isolated religious individuals. The particular
antinomian texts with which Cover engages here are legible writings, texts
entirely recognizable and authorized by a particular American legal order,
asserting canonical social power, whose predominant purpose
seems to have been to render isolate voices devoted to writing as
an physical event of immediate revelation. The
excommunication and banishment of the early American female
preacher and prophet Anne Hutchinson, and the comparison of
her opinions to monstrous births, is not unrelated to the editorial
69apprehension and domestication of Emily Dickinson. Cover
engages with these writings of and on behalf of the Mennonites and the Amish
because he perceives those groups as having properly identified with and
supported the University's claim that no "mere 'public policy' however
admirable, [should] triumph in the face of a claim to the first amendment's
special shelter against the crisis of conscience. 70
Cover's sympathy for the claims of Bob Jones University as precisely
constitutional claims, along with his sympathy for the self-accounts of the
communities recorded in the Mennonite and Amish Briefs, is rooted in his
perception that, often, religious groups will be the sources of the most powerful
challenges to the law embodied in the nomos and narrative of the civil
community. A religious group may produce a significantly challenging
alternative narrative when it strives to protect its "insular autonomy" or when,
going beyond that, it asserts a vision of "redemptive constitutionalism" 71: a
vision of-and perhaps a program for-transformation of the social world. In
65. It will be argued in Part Ill, infra, that this selection of a readily intelligible form of antinomian
writing marks a limit of the theoretical range and present relevance of N&N.
66. HowE, supra note 39, at 2.
67. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 59.
68. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 60.
69. HowE, supra note 39, at 1.
70. Cover, supra note 1, at 28.
71. Cover notes that he invokes this term specifically for its religious connotation, to highlight the
eschatological quality of visions that postulate:
(1) the unredeemed character of reality as we know it, (2) the fundamentally different reality
that should take its place, and (3) the replacement of the one with the other. The term
redemptive also has the connotation of saving or freeing persons, not only worlds or
understandings. I have chosen a word with the religious connotations of both personal and
cosmic freedom and bondage, because the paradigmatic cases I have in mind require just
such a heavy weight of meaning.
Id. at 35. Examples of movements for "redemptive constitutionalism" include the radical antislavery
movement of the 19t century and the Civil Rights movement of the late 20"' century-both of which
originated in part from sectarian-religious commitments, and both of which tended to remain "tied to the
religious traditions that invoke the vocabulary of redemption." Id.
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his consideration of Bob Jones University, specifically, Cover emphasizes and
valorizes the religious nature of the University's claims, arguing that their
religious nature was avoided and effectively devalued by the Court. Cover
insists that the claims should not have been displaced lightly with the Court's
invocation of "public policy" and its upholding the statutory interpretation of
an IRS bureaucrat. He urges that the Court ought to have engaged fully with
the religion-based claims attached to the constitutional principles of freedom of
association and of free exercise that belong to religious groups.
72
N&N includes an examination of the role of courts in the universe of
contending narratives, characterizing courts as "jurispathic" because of their
involvement in "killing law": in rejecting or destroying certain forms of nomos
in order to preserve an existing civil order.
Here Cover develops the notion that courts' impositions of legal meaning
and judges' forcible suppressions of certain nomic communities on behalf of
statist governments that enjoy no hermeneutic privilege must be characterized
as violent. There is no virtue of the state that gives it a superior claim to
obedience with regard to its law. Antinomy. A conflict of authority. A
contradiction between conclusions that seem equally logical
reasonable correct sealed natural necessary 7 3 It is "[b]y exercising
its superior brute force [that] the agency of state law shuts down the creative
hermeneutic of principle that is spread throughout our communities., 74 If such
violence is ultimately unavoidable, the central question for Cover is the degree
to which jurispathic violence against religious groups can be reduced: "The
question, then, is the extent to which coercion is necessary to the maintenance
of minimum conditions for the creation of legal meaning in autonomous
interpretive communities.,
7 1
The scope of inquiry of N&N is narrow: Cover examines the contest
between the prevailing civil nomos and the contending narrative of the religious
group. He avoids the more perilous inquiry into the violent force exercised by
the religious group against its own individual members' antinomian utterances
or claims of revelation closer to the boundaries of what wilderness and
76absolute freedom is the nature of expression. In so limiting its
scope, N&N is not uncharacteristic of American writing about law. Anne
Hutchinson's verbal expression is barely audible in the scanty
second- or thirdhand records of her two trials. Dorothy Talbye,
Mrs. Hopkins. Mary Dyer, Thomas Shepard, Mrs. Sparhawk,
Brother Crackbone's wife, Mary Rowlandson, Barbary Cutter,
Cotton Mather .... They express to me a sense of
72. Cover, supra note 1, at 66.
73. Howe, supra note 39, at 141.
74. Cover, supra note 1, at 44.
75. Id.
76. HOwE, supra note 39, at 2.
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unrevealedness.... [or] a sense of Substance/Being seeking to
be self-conscious. 77 This limitation of scope may be produced, in part, by
the sinuous wall that separates law and legal theory from literature. If she is
absent from N&N's study of American law's governance of religion, the
specter of Anne Hutchinson and her association with religion and with the
violent force of law will sometimes surface in American literature.
Antinomian Anne Hutchinson roams through Nathaniel
Hawthorne's imagination in The Scarlet Letter.78 It will not, however,
always do so. In 1830, "Mrs. Hutchinson" was one of Hawthorne's
first published stories. He removed it from later collections
gathered into books.79 If even a more capacious literature will not reliably
make room for the individual antinomian, how will law and legal theory come
to do so?
Cover sees judges as contributing to the violence of statist law whenever
they defer to "the violence of administration. '' 80 In Bob Jones, he claims, the
Supreme Court permitted such a violence to occur by deferring to the IRS and
holding merely that the IRS decision against the University had been "not
unconstitutional."'', The Court had failed to engage fully with any narrative of
"redemptive constitutionalism"--with a narrative about liberty of religious
autonomy and of educational association, for example; or with a narrative about
"the grand national travail" against race discrimination. 82 Thus, the Court had
failed to do justice to either the "insular communities" or the "minority
community," failing to provide for the former "a constitutional hedge against
mere administration, ''83 and failing to assure to the latter "a constitutional
commitment to avoiding public subsidization of racism. 84
In its critique of "jurispathic judges," N&N appears to invite a proliferation
of alternative nomoi and to offer support for a multiplicity of antinomian or
alternative-nomian forces. But N&N in fact supports only a narrow category of
the antinomian forces that have operated and continue to operate in American
society. Cover's focus on the interplay between constitutional text and the
argument of the Amicus Briefs in Bob Jones University avoids the existence of
antinomian discourse that is not readily translatable into the language of a
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 6, citing NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER AND OTHER TALES OF THE
PURITANS 50 (Harry Levin ed., 1961) ("This rose-bush, by a strange chance, has been kept alive in
history; but whether it had merely survived out of the stem old wilderness, so long after the fall of the
gigantic pines and oaks that overshadowed it,-or whether, as there is fair authority for believing, it had
sprung up under the footsteps of the sainted Ann Hutchinson, as she entered the prison-door,-we shall
not take upon us to determine.").
79. HOWE, supra note 39, at 9.
80. Cover, supra note 1, at 59.
81. Id. at 66.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 67.
84. Id.
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group, let alone into the language of law. "It is one thing for me to come
before a public magistracy and there to speak what they would
have me to speak and another when a man comes to me in a way
of friendship privately there is difference in that":
Mrs.Hutchinson to Governor Winthrop at her examination by the
Court at Newtowne, 1637. "What if the matter be all one." the
Governor answered.,8 5
It is true that Cover does not advocate entirely uncritical acceptance of all
the policies and visions advanced by resistant religious groups. He notes that
we must "examine the nomian worlds" created by any social movement-
taking the measure of "[tihe stories the resisters tell, the lives they live, the law
they make in such a movement." 86 But his critique of nomianism (to the degree
that that term connotes "jurispathy" and "law-killing") supports a set of
religious groups susceptible to the power of a jurispathic civil law, and it does
not address the plight of individuals within those groups who are vulnerable
before the force of religious law. The privileging of group antinomianism
marks a theoretical limitation of N&N, for antinomianism is the mark of an
87
individual. An antinomian is a religious enthusiast. The
enthusiast.. .is a solitary, who lives in a world of his own
peoplingi 8 T he real Anne Hutchinson was excommunicated
and banished by an affiliation of ministers and magistrates for
89the crime of religious enthusiasm. One aspect of this limitation
involves the simple gender-exclusivity produced by Cover's ignoring women:
there is no focus in N&N on particular risks for women. Another
limiting aspect derives from the fact that Cover wrote N&N before the
publication of such critical work as Alice Jardine's Gynesis in the mid-1980s
and Judith Butler's radical deconstructions of gender in early twenty-first
century queer theory. 91 Unable to have been informed by the complex
understandings expressed in such writings, N&N is naive in its blindness to the
operation of gendering throughout the communities whose antinomianism it
valorizes.
85. HOWE, supra note 39, at 13, citing THE A.NTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, supra note 42, at 319.
86. Cover, suprq note 1, at 68. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 31 n.7, pointing to Cover's disavowal,
some years after the publication of N&N, that the essay had presented "insular religious communities as
a model for law reform." See also ROBERT M. COVER, OwEN M. Fiss, & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE
729-730 (1988) (reporting a discussion between Cover and Owen Fiss). While Cover's disavowal should
not be ignored, it should perhaps be given only the weight due to an author's statement of authorial
intent; it cannot undo or diminish the religion-valorizing impact produced by the text of N&N itself.
87. HOwE, supra note 39, at 11.
88. Id. at 12, quoting 12 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, Marginalia 1, Abbt to Byfield, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 495-97 (George Whalley ed., 1980).
89. HOWE, supra note 39, at 9.
90. Id. at 3.
91. ALICE JARDINE, GYNESIS: CONFIGURATIONS OF WOMAN AND MODERNITY; JUDITH BUTLER,
UNDOING GENDER (2004).
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Cover felt hopeful, in 1983, about the "jurisgenerative" potential of
religious groups. His solicitude embraced those groups, as he argued that
religious communities and movements might enrich social life with new
meanings and might force judges to face the commitments entailed in their
judicial office and in their law. But Cover paid no attention, in N&N, to the
force exercised by religious groups themselves in their interactions with
individual group members; he paid no attention to such groups' suppressions of
the antinomian narratives of critical members and no attention to what Resnik
calls "the problem of the interaction among internal dissidents, paideic
communities, and the secular state."'92 His optimism included law with its
capacity for growth, narrative able to encourage such positive growth, and
religion able to generate transformative narrative. Thus he concluded: "Legal
meaning is a challenging enrichment of social life, a potential restraint on
arbitrary power and violence. We ought to stop circumscribing the nomos; we
ought to invite new worlds." 93 On its face, this invitation might seem to invite
the "new worlds" of women and the "different" readings and writings that
Resnik wants to include in her "new canon" of Law and Literature. But a close
reading of N&N, as engaged in the following Part, shows Cover's text,
underneath its inviting language, actively excludes women's worlds in law,
literature, and religion. It also shows that the differences advanced by Cover's
text are not sufficient to permit its escape from a worn-out legal liberalism.
II. UNCONSCIous GENDERING IN NOMOS AND NARRA TIVE
While the content of N&N, outlined in Part I, could be described as
consisting of propositions about law, narrative, and religion, it is inadequate to
read the essay without acknowledging one of its most striking features: its
elaboration of and privileging of male kinship relationships. From beginning to
end, N&N narrates a "universe" that is uncritically male-dominated and that is
almost exclusively male-occupied. N&N asserts an intent to open the door of
law and legal theory broadly, to "stop circumscribing the nomos,"94 and to
accommodate the challenges that jurisgenerative narratives may create for
existing law. Ironically, however, N&N itself excludes and refuses to engage
with women's accounts of women's experiences of law, narrative, and religion.
Careful reading of N&N will demonstrate that, in both its structure and its
content, N&N is highly gender-exclusive. Such a reading forcefully suggests
that N&N actively impeded the generation of narratives arising out of women's
experiences. It also evokes skepticism regarding claims that N&N "led the
92. Resnik, supra note 12, at 47.
93. Cover, supra note 1, at 68.
94. Id.
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way" for women's writing95 and that it "transcends"96 the limitations produced
by its gender-exclusivity.
Cover noted in N&N that "[c]hoosing ancestry is a serious business with
major implications. 9 7 N&N can be read as a record of Cover's own chosen
ancestry and of his self-constructed intellectual family tree, consisting of
scholars from many disciplines who had engaged with his law, narrative, and
religion themes. My re-reading of N&N explores its privileging of various male
kinship connections and particularly the intellectual ancestry that Cover has
chosen. In considering the "major implications" of his choices, this Part, while
highlighting the familial or tribal bonds that Cover affirms, attempts also to
acknowledge some of the intellectual relatives not included in N&N's
genealogy. It attempts to shed light on the ways in which the gendered nature
of Cover's intellectual bondings limited both the "reading" that N&N
accomplished and the "writing" that it constituted.
N&N's almost exclusively male kinship structure figures in every element
of the essay and has been surprisingly unremarked. N&N's treatments of each
of its three central preoccupations-law, narrative, and religion-function to
facilitate a dense elaboration of homo-intellectual bondings. To demonstrate
this, it will be useful to consider the relationships Cover avows throughout
N&N. In this consideration, the gendering promulgated by N&N's selective
preferencing of homo-intellectual connections (and its exclusions of other
possibilities) will become evident. Its exclusively male gendering greatly
limits the critical force of N&N, and this limitation must not be overlooked or
minimized either in future Law and Literature projects or in future
considerations of American law regarding religion.
Exploring the gendering operative in N&N, I note, first, that Cover
modeled his "pure" theory ofjurisgenerativity upon the nomos of a specifically
male kinship network. Secondly, I show that Cover engaged with only male
kin and developed his argument in conversation with only male predecessors
and peers-a homo-intellectual network of fathers and brothers that excluded
women's perspectives and avoided discussion of relevant writings by women. I
suggest that the effects of this exclusion were not trivial, that the exclusion
worked both to constrain and to shore up the particular critique elaborated in
N&N-its valorization of one kind of antinomianism and its overlooking of
other kinds. Cover urged his readers to measure any given nomos according to
what it offers for the narratives we may want to elaborate, for the lives we may
be able to lead, and for the law-making to which we hope to offer some
contribution.9" If N&N is to enjoy a certain normative space within libraries of
95. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 41.
96. Resnik, supra note 12, at 53.
97. Cover, supra note 1, at 18.
98. Id. at 68.
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Law and Literature, if it is to deserve the new canonization that Resnik
advocates, Cover's work should be able to survive those same measures.
My critique of the unconscious gendering evident in N&N is focused
entirely on its text and not on its author. I never met Robert Cover in person,
but from my first encounters with his writing I have thought of him as akin to
myself. I had heard of his involvement in civil rights activism in the South and
work with SNCC, in which I myself had participated in the 1960s. 99 I felt a
kinship with him on the basis of that common experience, one that I continue to
feel. I experienced grief when I learned of his death: I had wanted more of his
words. I engage with N&N now because I recognize the current, renewed
attention to this work, and I believe that N&N may continue to shape and
constrain both the Law and Literature project and projects concerning law and
religion. I engage also because my sense of connection to Cover has, for more
than twenty years, drawn and re-drawn me to his work. While I am unable to
join the highly positive assessment of N&N that Resnik offers, because I do not
see Cover's work as "transcending" its exclusive gendering, I do recognize the
originality and strength that marked its appearance in 1983. So, in this Part, I
offer a hermeneutic that is as troubled as it is appreciative. The ambiguous
paths of kinship pul me in opposite ways at once. 100 With regard to
N&N, I record my deep ambivalence.
A. "Jurisgenesis" and Patrilinearity
In some ways it seems particularly appropriate to map N&N through a grid
of kinship, precisely because its central explication of the processes of
"jurisgenesis" and of "the thickness of legal meaning" involved Cover in his
own examinations of kinship-specifically male kinship-relations. Looking
into prescriptions regulating relationships of ancestry and offspring, Cover
inquires into the Biblical "law" constructing the meaning patriarchal
relationships between progenitors and their sons. His elaboration of these
notions leads him to read the "precept" stated in Deuteronomy that defines the
law of primogeniture:
If a man has two wives, one loved and the other hated, and both the
loved and hated have borne him sons, but the first born is the son of
the hated wife-when he leaves his inheritance to his sons he may not
prefer the son of the beloved wife over the elder son of the hated wife.
He must acknowledge the first born son of the hated wife and give him
the double portion. For he is the first fruit of his loins and to him is the
birthright due.' 0 '
99. See generally Burt, supra note 62, at 1-8.
100. HOWE, supra note 3, at 7.
101. Cover, supra note 1, at 20 (quoting Deuteronomy 21:15-17).
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The law expressed in Deuteronomy is of interest to Cover because of its
contrast with a number of Biblical-canonical narratives that recount violations
of the primogeniture-birthright mandate. Cover cites several of these:
(1) the story of Cain and Abel, in which God accepts the sacrifice of
Abel, the younger son, rather than that of Cain, the elder, and in which
Seth, the third born, ultimately becomes the progenitor of the human
race; (2) the story of Ishmael and Isaac, in which Ishmael, the first fruit
of Abraham's loins, is cast out so that the birthright might pass to
Isaac, the later son born of the preferred wife; (3) the story of Esau, the
first-born son of Isaac, who is denied his birthright by the trickery of
Jacob, his younger brother; and (4) the story of Joseph and his
brothers, in which Joseph-a younger child of the preferred wife-is
favored by his father, dreams of his own primacy, provokes retaliation,
and comes to rule over his brothers in an improbable political
ascendancy in another land. Indeed, all of the stories of the patriarchs
revolve around the overturning of the "normal" order of succession-a
pillar of the legal civilization that is formally enunciated in the code
portions of Deuteronomy itself.
102
The tales invoked by Cover to illustrate his general theory of "jurisgenesis"
are almost entirely tales of men, not women, engaged in conflict and struggle;
this is true not only of the Biblical texts he examines, but also of other literature
on which he comments. Thus, in his footnote 66, wherein Cover surveys
literary and historical manifestations of the power of revelation and prophecy,
he cites as a paradigm Dostoevsky's 19th Century novel of fraternal conflict
and patricide, The Brothers Karamazov.103 Only once in that lengthy footnote
does Cover refer to a woman, and this single reference is a brief comment:
"The extraordinary trial of Anne Hutchinson in Massachusetts Bay in 1637 also
demonstrates the dangerous character of a return to revelation in a legal world
founded on revelation."' 4 The inclusion of merely passing reference to a
single woman is particularly striking in this writing purportedly engaged with
American law and American religion, given the reality of female-gendered
American religious controversy and persecution. The three most serious
threats to the political and religious stability of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the Seventeenth century-
the Antinom.ian controversy-1636, the Quaker persecutions of
102. Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted). The Deuteronomic law of primogeniture and the challenges
raised against it by competing Scriptural narratives constitute the "pure" (that is, the non-statist) model
of "law creation" central to the thought of N&N. These tales are relevant as illustrative of Cover's claim
that the rejection of preceptual law tends to be supported by claims of "divine destiny" or justified by
invocations of a higher force. The discontinuity in the legal order that is produced by the violation of
the precept, justified by reference to divine destiny, amounts to a "dangerous return" to a "sacred
beginning." Id. at 23. Cover identifies revelations and prophecy as "the revolutionary challenges to an
order founded on revelation." Id.
103. Id. at23 n.66.
104. Id.
2006]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
the 1650s and the Witchcraft hysteria in 1692-all directly
involved women. 105
While he treats extensively the structure of law governing male family
relationships, Cover offers no discussion at all of women's family issues and
the law governing them, even when constitutional case law would readily invite
such discussion. Motherly Piety: an anonymous old woman of
Ipwsich, swaddled in silence, stranded in darkness, serves as
Governor Winthrop's exemplary version during the disorderly
days of the birth of his colony, when Mrs. Hutchinson, a mother
and a midwife, impiously dared to Breach and urophesy. 106 Cover
cites in only the most summary fashion to Roe v. Wade,107 with no exploration
of how that opinion governing women's "generative" capacities, women's
decisions about reproduction and birth will actually affect women. Likewise,
he refers just in passing, in the course of his discussion of "redemptive
constitutionalism," to both the "women's movement" and the "right-to-life
movement;" Cover emphasizes their similarities while merely noting that both
of these movements participate in a "way of thinking about law and liberty"
that wants to "liberate persons and the law and to raise them from a fallen
state.", 8
And Cover references in an extraordinarily summary and entirely uncritical
way the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,109 in which the Supreme Court
tolerated the dis-privileging of matrilineal lineage by an Indian tribe. The tribe
discriminated in its differential treatment of male and female members who had
married outside the tribe, permitting tribal membership to children of such male
members, while denying that status to children of similarly-situated female
members."10 Cover's citation to Martinez provides absolutely no account of the
facts of the case, referencing it only to support his broad proposition that the
constitutionally-protected right that derives from "freedom of association" is
"not a liberty to be but a liberty and capacity to create and interpret law-
minimally, to interpret the terms of the association's own beinig."' Further
expanding on this proposition without any acknowledgement that the case
raises an issue of gender discrimination that may have been treated
inadequately (or "violently," perhaps, in Cover's own terminology) when
avoided by the Martinez Court, Cover comments:
The religion clauses of the Constitution seem to me unique in the
clarity with which they presuppose a collective, norm-generating
community whose status as a community and whose relationship with
105. HowE, supra note 3, at 113.
106. HowE, supra note 39, at 27.
107. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), cited in Cover, supra note 1, at 7.
108. Cover, supra note 1, at 35.
109. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
110. Jd. at 52.
Ill. Cover, supra note 1, at 32.
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the individuals subject to its norms are entitled to constitutional
recognition and protection.
Respect for a degree of norm-generating autonomy has also
traditionally been incident to the federal government's relations with
Indian tribes."1
2
Cover's attempt to privilege a kind of sovereignty in religious groups has
the effect of banishing to the distant margins the realities of discrimination
against individuals-and particularly against women-perpetrated by religious
or quasi-religious associations. He does not explicitly characterize the
exclusions and oppressions perpetrated against women as instances of the
"violence" of religious or other communities to which these women are
attached, nor does he seriously discuss the failure of Martinez Court to provide
constitutional or statutory protection against sex discrimination significantly
disfavoring women. The absence of any discussion of these issues is a
remarkable omission in a writing so deeply preoccupied with law's "violence."
Resnik's recent commentary on N&N alludes to Cover's omission in this
case; she observes: "The Supreme Court's conclusion [in Martinez] was the
kind of jurisdictional decision Cover identified as a failure."113  But this
observation is misleading to the degree that it seemingly implies that Cover
himself made any such criticism of Martinez. It is Resnik (and not Cover) who
first makes the argument that federal courts fail when they avoid issues of sex
discrimination (as the Court did in Martinez). Cover's concern in N&N was
about access to the courts by "paideic communities"--that is, by groups (and,
especially, religious groups)-not about access by an individual woman such
as Julia Martinez, complaining about the group's discrimination against her and
her child. Thus, Resnik's reading of N&N, while properly and importantly
pointing to some limits of Cover's essay, involves a maneuver of avoidance
that resembles the very avoidance maneuvers made by courts and canon-
makers that both she and Cover want to expose and to subvert.
B. Robert Cover's Intellectual Kinship in Nomos and Narrative
The focus on patrilineality evident in Cover's examination of
"jurisgenerativity" is paralleled by his elaboration of a broad intellectual-
kinship" 4 network that is almost entirely male. If Cover's focus on
patrilinearity reflected a rather uncritical foregrounding of "natural" father-son
relationships and contests, Cover did understand the genealogical location of
his work as involving conscious and deliberative construction, involving
112. Id. at 32 n.94.
113. Resnik, supra note 12, at 47-48.
114. The concept of "kinship" has, of course, been problernatized. See JUDITH BUTLER, Is Kinship
Always Already Heterosexual?, in UNDOING GENDER 102-130 (2004).
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choices, and generating "major implications." In writing N&N, Cover made
particular choices of ancestry and of kinship. Although, at the time of its
publication, there were women authors engaged in important work that related
to the themes and preoccupations of N&N, Cover's chosen intellectual kin were
almost entirely male. His exclusionary choices carry "major implications"--
limiting implications-for the theoretical value of N&N.
1. Male Intellectual Kin
N&N asserts a multitude of interdisciplinary connections, many of which
can be characterized as fraternal; the text includes numerous references to
intellectual brothers who inhabit, along with Cover, the intellectual sphere
involving law and legal theory. Other scholars referenced by Cover could be
characterized as male cousins, at work in the other disciplines that Cover will
investigate for their relevance to legal theory. Thus, Cover cites the legal
scholarship of Owen Fiss;115 of John Noonan;"16 of William Bishin and
Christopher Stone;' 17 of Richard Kluger; 118 of Gary Gilmore, 119 and of H.L.A.
Hart and Ronald Dworkin.120 He cites literary critic George Steiner, 121 novelist
Norman Mailer,122 and philosopher H. Gadamer. 123 He references prominent
psychologists, Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget and John
Bowlby. 124 All of these are men. Additionally, Cover cites many religious
thinkers, representing a variety of religious traditions-Jewish: Simeon the Just
of approximately 200 B.C.E., 12 and Joseph Karo (or Caro) of the sixteenth
century; 126 Christian: Karl Barth 127 and John Hostetler;128 and Hindu: Mahatma
Gandhi. 29 These, too, are all male. Among the men predominantly featured in
N&N are legal scholar Mark DeWolfe Howe and two writers who have been of
significance for Law and Literature: Wallace Stevens and James Boyd
White. 130
115. Cover, supra note 1, at 5 n.7.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 6 n.11.
118. Id. at 8 n.20.
119. Id. at 9 n.25.
120. Id. at 17 n.44.
121. Cover, supra note 1, at 9 n.27.
122. Id. at 8 n.21.
123. Id. at 6 n.1.
124. Id. at 16 nn.42 & 43.
125. Id. at 11 n.31, 12-13.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Cover, supra note 1, at 13-14.
128. Id. at 29-30 nn.82 & 85.
129. Id. at 49 n.133.
130. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Wallace Stevens, and James Boyd White are discussed in Part II.B.3,
infra.
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2. Antinomian Women's Writings
While broadly inclusive of male intellectual peers and predecessors, N&N
references only a very few intellectual sisters-women working in relevant
interdisciplinary areas, who were Cover's contemporaries and whose work had
appeared before the publication of N&N. These women include Carol
Weisbrod, Barbara Black, and Carol Gilligan. Cover acknowledges that both
Barbara Black and Carol Weisbrod wrote about the intersection of law and
religion, an issue central to N&N. But his treatment of each of these writers is
minimal. In support of his own proposition that private law may be nomos-
generative, he references Barbara Black's unpublished doctoral dissertation,
authored in 1975, which he characterizes as having "eloquently described the
processes by which a private law document came to have overpowering effect
as the public law of the Massachusetts Bay Colony for the colony's entire first
charter period."' 31 Yet, despite this endorsement, Cover provides no real
engagement with-nor even any summary account of-the argument that
Black had developed in her dissertation.
While the unpublished status of Black's writing might account for Cover's
decision not to discuss it in detail, his treatment of Carol Weisbrod's work
cannot be similarly justified. At the time of the publication of N&N, Carol
Weisbrod's book The Boundaries of Utopia32 had been in print for three years,
and Cover was certainly familiar with it. Weisbrod's work is closely related to
Cover's; The Boundaries of Utopia explores the role of contract law in the
formation and support of a variety of Utopian communal projects of nineteenth-
century America. Many of the projects Weisbrod studied were religious
communistic societies: the Shakers, the Harmony Society, the Oneida
Perfectionist community, and the Zoar community, which bear some
resemblance to the Mennonite and Amish groups so positively characterized by
Cover. However, Cover's treatment of Weisbrod's work, which he does
characterize as "excellent,"' 133 is highly selective. Cover cites Weisbrod's work
for the ways in which it parallels his own; he describes Weisbrod's focus on the
function of contract law as paralleling his own focus on the Free Exercise
Clause, as both involve characterizations of insular communities as deriving
support from internal legal principles. 34 Cover also invokes Weisbrod to link
the Shakers to the Amish (whom he has already discussed) when he proposes
that both the Shakers and the Amish understand the nature and the foundation
of their communal associations from perspectives different from the
131. Cover, supra note 1, at 31 n.89, citing Barbara Black, The Judicial Power and the General
Court in Early Massachusetts (1634-1686) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file
with Yale University Library).
132. CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980).
133. Cover, supra note 1, at 30.
134. Id. at 12.
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perspectives of the state. 135 Yet Cover does not mention Weisbrod's non-
parallel themes or her arguments in tension with his own.
Entirely absent from N&N is any engagement with the major themes of The
Boundaries of Utopia that deal with the "dark side"'136 of insular religious
communities and that therefore raise notes discordant with Cover's attitude
toward religious associations. Weisbrod focuses extensively on the litigation
initiated by "ex-Utopians," or individuals who had once been members of these
insular communities, but who had either left voluntarily or been expelled. The
Boundaries of Utopia attends to the internal divisions that afflicted the
communities, while at the same time exploring conflicts between the religious
community's law and the civil law. Weisbrod examines, for example, ways in
which the concentration of property in a "religious group" might be
inconsistent with "mortmain" laws intended to assure the free transfer of
property. 137 She also records how individuals outside the insular societies
sometimes perceived particular groups as threatening because of their claims to
group autonomy. 38 Much of the litigation she recounts involved property
issues and contract theory. When a group of English Puritans entered
into an explicit contract they called a Covenant with God and left
the European continent in what later came to be known as the
Great Migration of the 1630s. they were trespassers .... rThey
were also anxious not to be considered Separatist .... rTlhese
separating nonSeparatists were lawless in their particular
northwestern settlement abroad in the world at the eastern
margin of a continent."9
Insular communities typically required, often through the mechanism of
contract, that an individual granted membership give all his property (both real
and personal) to the group upon admission. In return, the individual would
receive support while he remained a member. 40  However, members-and
their children-would have no legal claim to take any property with them if
they left the group. Weisbrod notes that these practices were sometimes
perceived as oppressive; she cites, for example, the criticisms of Shaker society
formulated by Samuel Tilden:
If its internal police extends to the supervision and control of the
minutest personal concerns; if its fundamental law is an unqualified
submission of its members to their irresponsible rulers, and if the
penalty with which those rulers are armed is a forfeiture of all he
possesses by any member who shall be ejected from or shall leave the
association,-can it be that a society so constructed and possessing
135. Id. at 33.
136. WEISBROD, supra note 132, at xv.
137. Id. at29-30.
138. Id. at 44.
139. HOWE, supra note 39, at 3.
140. WEISBROD, supra note 132, at 38-40.
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such powers shall not frequently work great individual wrong and
oppression?
141
Weisbrod herself criticizes the application of contract law by courts of the
"outside society," which failed to probe into the ability of second-generation
communitarians to have truly "chosen" the insular life.' 42  She questions
specifically the failure of courts to probe into issues of lack of capacity and of
duress or undue influence. 43 She also problematizes courts' refusals to probe
into the religious doctrines of particular societies that had ejected members on
the basis that those members had deviated from the doctrines. Illustrating the
hardship that could be produced by such refusals, she cites Grosvenor v. United
Society of Believers.144 That case involved two sisters, Maria and Roxalana
Grosvenor, who had gone to live with the Shakers as children in 1819, along
with their parents and two brothers. In 1834, the Grosvenor sisters had become
members of the Shaker society by signing a covenant. After they had lived in
the Shaker community at Harvard, Massachusetts for forty-six years, Maria and
Roxalana Grosvenor were expelled from the community for "doctrinal
deviance."' 14S They sued, alleging that their doctrines (which involved some
interest in mesmerism) were not deviant. The sisters were unable to obtain any
relief in the Massachusetts courts and, indeed, were not permitted to present
evidence that their beliefs were not deviant and that they were not in violation
of their covenant with the community.1
46
Weisbrod also problematizes the American history of respect for "church
autonomy," as that had developed by the time of her own and Cover's writing
in the early 1980s, in a way that strongly differentiates her work from N&N.
She characterizes the "separationist" tradition as involving a combination of
"statements of religious toleration with statements of the limitations on state
and judicial action. The American constitutional position was that courts
would not judge religious questions."'147 Weisbrod's attitude toward religious
groups and their claims to group autonomy is much more ambivalent and much
less sanguine than that of Cover. Weisbrod criticizes judicial avoidance of the
injuries to individuals--often women-perpetrated by religious groups. In
contrast, Cover criticizes judicial avoidance of claims asserted by the religious
groups themselves.
The differences between Weisbrod and Cover are significant. Weisbrod
notes that "[w]e are accustomed to thinking well of the utopians, seeing them as
141. Id. at 44, citing Considerations in Regard to the Application of the Shakers for Certain Special
Privileges, in I SAMUEL J. TILDEN, THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SAMUEL J. TILDEN 95 n.41 (John
Bigelow ed. 1885).
142. WEISBROD, supra note 132, at 127-128.
143. Id. at 192-194.
144. Grosvenor v. United Soc'y of Believers, 118 Mass. 78 (1875).
145. WEISBROD, supra note 132, at 205.
146. The Grosvenor case is discussed in WEISBROD, supra note 132, at 149-52.
147. Id. at 168.
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sincerely motivated individuals working collectively to accomplish
fundamentally commendable objectives. ' ' 48 Certainly it would seem fair to
characterize N&N as embodying such a sanguine view of the Amish, the
Mennonites, and the Quakers. But Weisbrod is careful, herself, to
acknowledge the limits of Utopia; she notes the criticism of the Utopians that
was articulated in their own time. She cites Henry James's review of Charles
Nordhoff's (positive) assessment of communal societies. Weisbrod reports that
James noted the "friendly spirit" of Nordhoff, but that James also noted it
would have been possible "for an acute moralist to travel over the same ground
as Mr. Nordhoff and to present in consequence a rather duskier picture of
human life at Amana, Mount Lebanon, and Oneida."' 149 [A] utopian exodus
can't allow negligence.150 Lawlessness seen as negligence is at
first feminized and then restricted or banished.151 Weisbrod notes
that James perceived the Shaker society as "grotesque and perverted in many
ways," but also as being "both the source and the fruit of a considerable
personal self-respect."' 5 2 It seems fair to characterize Cover as having the
Nordhoff-type of "friendly spirit" toward the religious groups he considered
and as lacking the more complicated understandings and critical perspectives
expressed by Henry James and, in measured ways, by Weisbrod herself.
At the theoretical level, a contrast between Weisbrod and Cover is also
apparent in their differing emphases upon Mark DeWolfe Howe's writing about
religion and law. Weisbrod cites to Howe after she has offered an account of
various utopian communities that have expelled members "at the sole discretion
of the leader, without trial, process, opportunity for rebuttal, written charges,
notice." 153 She acknowledges Howe's formulation of a constitutional argument
that could be asserted in support of the religious groups: "Is it possible,
perhaps, that a church is denied its constitutional liberty in a state which
compels it to adopt a form of government which its tradition repudiates?'
' 54
Nonetheless, while raising that question as relevant, Weisbrod-perhaps
because of her focus upon the harm to individuals, such as the Grosvenor
sisters, produced by unconstrained liberty in religious groups-does not appear
to share Cover's enthusiasm for elevating all claims of religious groups to
constitutional status. Weisbrod finds Howe's suggestions about a such a
"possibility" to be perhaps relevant; Cover, on the other hand, wants to convert
Howe's "possibility" into a "reality" of constitutional status for religious
groups' liberty claims, and he is willing to do that without the counterbalancing
148. Id. at 35.
149. Henry James, Nordhoff's Communistic Societies of the United States, THE NATION, Jan. 14,
1875, at 26-27, cited in WEISBROD, supra note 132, at 35 n.5.
150. HOWE, supra note 39, at 3.
151. Id. at 1.
152. WEISBROD, supra note 132, at 243 n.5.
153. Id. at 206.
154. How, supra note 2, at 34, cited in WEISBROD, supra note 132, at 206.
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force that Mark DeWolfe Howe had proposed (ensuring protection for "non-
believers" in constitutional provisions other than the Religion Clauses). 155 Had
Cover considered The Boundaries of Utopia more fully, his overwhelmingly
positive assessment of the autonomy of religious groups would have been
challenged. Real engagement with Weisbrod's work might have demanded
that Cover pay attention to the antinomianisms of individuals-especially
women-unheard and unheeded by either their religious communities or the
"outside" law.
The assessment of the nature of religious groups offered by N&N
sometimes seems to be either willfully blind or na've. For example, Cover
appears to have accepted entirely the narratives he extracts from the Mennonite
and Amish briefs that he cites.' 56 Abandoning any posture of critique, Cover
does not question whether those groups were really cohesive and
homogeneous; instead, N&N accepts at face value the accounts of community
formulated by the brief-writers. In only the most minimal way does Cover
acknowledge the reality of internal division within religious groups; while
internal divisions may have afflicted "the Mormons at Nauvoo," he appears to
suggest, they are unlikely to be a problem for the "peaceful" Amish, Mennonite
and Quaker communities. 157  But recent historical work belies Cover's
depiction of the insular religious groups-in their paideic communities-as
homogeneous and coherent. A study of the Old Order Amish community, for
example, documents the deep internal divisions underlying the litigation
commenced in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
158
More importantly, Cover's model of paideic community ignores the reality
of injustices committed by such religious groups against their own members.
N&N fails to address the reality of the violent force of religious law. In its
valorization of religious groups it does not engage with the realities of
injustices perpetrated by antinomians-become-nomian. John Cofton
was... Anne Hutchinson's minister, friend, and eventually
persecutor. Sometime during the antinomian controversy in
New England a spark from the fire of Scripture singed the heart
of the minister-scholar [John Cotton]. "If we be hemm'd in with
this Covenant we cannot break out," he once wrote.'59 It is, of
course, not necessary to look to nineteenth-century utopian communities, or
even to insular contemporary religious groups, to find instances of troubling or
oppressive actions. It is possible to see a connecting line in Massachusetts that
links Anne Hutchinson of the seventeenth century to the banished Grosvenor
155. See discussion infra at note 220 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
157. Cover, supra note 1, at 51-52.
158. See SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, THE YODER CASE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND
PARENTAL RIGHTS (2003).
159. HOWE, supra note 39, at 3.
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sisters of the nineteenth century, and to Sister Jeannette Normandin, who was
banished from Boston's Jesuit Urban Center in 2000.160 Each of these
situations involved the action of a religious group confident of its authority to
banish members and of its liberty to expel-into a "wilderness"--a (not-
entirely-incidentally female) member on the basis of her "deviance."
Besides eliding Carol Weisbrod's writing, Cover also barely addresses the
work of Carol Gilligan, whose book, In a Different Voice, was published in
1980, three years prior to the publication of N&N. 16 1 Cover cites Gilligan's
work, which is concerned about differences in the moral development of male
and female children, for its relevance to the model of psychological separation
that occurs within communities. Cover addresses this kind of separation
primarily by reference to the writings of Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg,
Jean Piaget, and John Bowlby.162 N&N's treatment of Gilligan is striking in its
dual advance/retreat character. Cover comments:
I am tempted at least to invite comparison between the psychological
dimension of the paideic/imperial distinction and the differences some
scholars have suggested exist between male and female psychologies
of moral development. 1
63
Cover is "tempted" to invite comparison between a distinction that he
offers in N&N and a distinction that Gilligan elaborates, but he does not yield
to the temptation. What if he had done so? Is Cover suggesting that his
paideic:imperial distinction corresponds to a male:female distinction? Or is he
suggesting the opposite? Would further inquiry into Gilligan's work have
perhaps disturbed N&N's model ofjurisgenesis, which is so attached to tales of
males alone? Which of the differing moral tales told by Gilligan's models of
male and female moral decision-making would correspond to which of Cover's
models? Would Gilligan's proposition that gender is an important marker of
difference have disturbed the apparently homogeneous and unconflicted
"insular communities" idealized in N&N? Is Cover's resistance to the
"temptation" of Gilligan's work consistent with the particular account of "law-
160. Sister Jeannette Normandin, a seventy-two-year-old nun, had worked for many years at the
Jesuit Urban Center in Boston, in a ministry devoted to women with AIDS. During the course of
administration of the Sacrament of Baptism to two infants by a Catholic priest at the Jesuit Urban Center
in Boston, Sister Jeannette participated in the baptismal ritual by anointing one child with chrism oil and
pouring water on the second child, "violating a church tenet that allows only ordained deacons and
priests-all of whom are male-to perform baptisms, except in emergencies." Michael Paulson, I
Couldn't Believe This Was Happening to Me: After Ouster, a Nun Struggles to Rethink and Rebuild Her
Life, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 2001, at 1, available at 2002 WLNR 2228747. In response to this action,
she was "banished" from the Urban Center and evicted from her housing. "The Jesuits fired Normandin.
She had to leave her residence .... " Id. at 3.
161. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1980), cited in Cover, supra note 1, at 16 n.43.
162. See Cover, supra note I. at 5 n.8 (discussing ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY
(1950); LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981); JEAN PIAGET, THE
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932); and JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1969-1980); id.
at 16 nn. 42 & 43 (further discussing the writing of John Bowlby).
163. Id. at 16 n.43 (emphasis added).
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creation" and "religion" that N&N offers, in which patriarchs and their sons are
featured, and in which the heretical and banished Anne Hutchinson receives
only passing mention? N&N's avoidance of engagement here is a mark of
limitation.
It is "tempting," indeed, to speculate about the meanings of Cover's having
resisted the temptation to think about gender in its connections to law, to
narrative, and to religion-each of which is closely associated with "moral
decision-making." Tl]he history of antinomianism in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony (1635-37). encoded in the story of
Anne Hutchinson, is gendered from the beginning.'64 Certainly
Gilligan's work proved to be a major point of reference and/or departure for the
feminist theory that would develop during the 1980s, in which feminist writers
of every ilk felt the need to engage, whether appreciatively or critically, with In
a Different Voice.165 Some of the critique of Gilligan's work has seen it as
implicated in the "essentialism" of "cultural feminism"-in its insistence on a
clear difference between male and female moral decision-making processes.
166
This criticism seems well-founded. Yet, perhaps it is possible recognize a
critical "difference" in "feminine" voice without locating that difference in a
female speaker. If there is Woman in [Charlesl Olson's writing
(there aren't women there), she is either "Cunt." "Great
Mother." "Cow." or "Whore." But the feminine is very much in
his poems in another way .... It's voice... It has to do with the
presence of absence. With articulation of sound forms. The
fractured syntax, the gaps, the silences....167 The problematizing
of gender that has occurred since the 1980 publication of In a Different Voice,
which has supported critiques of Gilligan's work, may mark it as less
interesting now than it seemed at the time of its publication. But Cover's utter
lack of engagement with it, his resisting the temptation of Carol Gilligan, seems
inexcusable. Meaningful engagement with Gilligan might have prompted
Cover to interrogate his own reliance on explicitly patriarchal models of
164. HOWE, supra note 39, at x.
165. For an early assessment of In a Different Voice, identifying various schools of "equality
theory"-the "sameness" or assimilationist model; the "respect-for-differences" model; and the
"limited-differences" model-and locating Gilligan's work in the middle grouping and identifying some
of its "normative and narrative failures," see Ashe, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 18, at 1137-
1149.
166. See, for example, ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 110-116 (1988),
pointing to the limitations of the "cultural feminism" associated with Gilligan's work, and noting, in
particular, that Gilligan's "difference" theory was utilized to the detriment of female employees in the
case of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. See 628 F. Supp. 1264,
1308 (N.D. III. 1986), af'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (relying on testimony by an expert witness for
Sears that women's traditional values accounted for their lower-paid positions within the Sears work
force).
167. Talisman Interview, supra note 21, at 180.
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jurisgenerativity and would have challenged him to articulate a justification of
his own gender-exclusivity.
Cover could hardly have engaged deeply with Weisbrod's and Gilligan's
perspectives without having to re-think his central argument, because these
writings challenge N&N's own narrative and the normativity to which it would
itself contribute. In light of Weisbrod and Gilligan's work, N&N seems to be
an uncritical narrative about the value of insular and patriarchal religious
groups, contributing to a normativity within which such groups are entitled to
particular privilege. Weisbrod's writing exposes the harms inflicted by
religious groups upon their individual members. Gilligan's writing
challenges-by providing an alternative to--what she characterizes as male-
gendered processes of moral decision-making that support patriarchal societies.
Each of these writings is a counter-narrative that challenges Cover's own
nomos. Relative to N&N, these writings (by women) are antinomian. Cover's
legal theory focuses on the nomianism of civil government and the
antinomianism of religious groups; it ignores the nomianism of religious groups
and the antinomianisms of individual members of those groups. Finally, it
ignores the antinomianisms of female critics of patriarchal groups and of male-
gendered theories.
Cover's passing references to Weisbrod, Gilligan, and Black constitute the
totality of his inclusion of women among his intellectual siblings. This almost
total failure to engage with important relevant work by his women
contemporaries contrasts dramatically with Cover's engagements with male
writers. The male writers who occupy favored positions in terms of Cover's
claim of relationship to them are James Boyd White, Wallace Stevens, and
Mark DeWolfe Howe. Cover's active choice of these particular kin and their
writings locates N&N and its author within a lineage and a kinship network of
liberal male writers, whose work is marked by troubling treatment-or non-
treatment-of women and of women's narrativity.
3. Mark DeWolfe Howe: Intellectual Father
The scholar whose work figures most prominently in the text of N&N-
warranting his designation as Cover's "intellectual father"--is Mark DeWolfe
Howe. 168 I use the term "intellectual father" here to point to the enormous
influence that Howe exercised on Cover (evident in the many parallels that
mark their writings) and the coincident anxiety about that influence manifested
by Cover in N&N. In this Section, while describing the father-son intellectual
bond between Howe and Cover, I will at the same time include some relevant
commentary selected from writings of Susan Howe, Mark DeWolfe Howe's
168. Harvard Law School professor Mark DeWolfe Howe was the biographer of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes.
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actual daughter and Cover's generational contemporary. These fragments are
introduced here to record some of her experiences as a daughter and sister in
relationship to the writings of both Mark DeWolfe Howe and Robert Cover.
A major American legal historian, Mark DeWolfe Howe took as his most
significant scholarly enterprise the writing of a multi-volume biography of
Oliver Wendell Holmes169 -a work to which he devoted his life. I
remember him in his study late in the evening with his light-
shade on because his eyes must have tired from so much reading
for the Holmes book and students' papers, etc., but he would be
bent over some old Mather or Sewell diary for relaxation!
170
Howe's work connects to Cover's through their three common concerns: First,
with issues of law in general; second, with issues of religion as they intersect
with law; and third, with social and cultural forces outside preceptual law that
are expressed in a universe of narratives.
In N&N, Cover discusses two of Howe's notable law and religion writings:
his 1953 Harvard Law Review foreword 171 and his 1965 book The Garden and
the Wilderness, a volume that has long been of interest to students of law and
religion and that has recently received new attention.17 3 Examination of both
these writings demonstrates remarkable parallels between the Howe and the
Cover projects. Howe's law and religion subject matter immediately evidences
a commonality of interest; additionally, Howe's Legal Realist focus can be read
as to some degree anticipatory or predictive of the model of narrativity
expressed in N&N. Reading N&N for its connection to Howe's work, however,
we can discern something beyond parallelism and influence; we can see, in
addition, Cover's intent to surpass and to supercede what Howe had already
accomplished, to prevail in an agonic struggle with an influential predecessor-
father. 174 I will point here to some of the strong parallels between Howe and
Cover and will argue that Cover did, in fact, surpass Howe by virtue of the
originality of his development of the meaning of "narrativity." Still, I will
argue that Cover's surpassing of Howe included an amplification of a serious
error--one perhaps invited by Howe's early writing-involving the definition
169. 1 MARK DEWOLFE HowE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 1841-
1870 (1957); 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOwE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS
1870-1882 (1963). See also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed. 1953); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL RIGHTS LETTERS
AND THE DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1947).
170. Talisman Interview, supra note 21, at 161.
171. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 91 (1953).
172. HOWE, supra note 2.
173. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (discussing THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS).
174. Cover cites to HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973), for what that book
offers "[o]n the agonistic circumstances of all interpretation." See Cover, supra note 1, at 5 n.7.
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of the proper relationship between "preceptual law" and religious groups. I
will suggest, further, that the writings of both Howe and Cover involve errors-
both of omission and of commission-that have important continuing
implications limiting their usefulness for present considerations of the problems
of law, religion, and gender. Now I know that the arena in which
Scripture battles raged among New Englanders with oriqinary
fury is part of our current American system and events, history
and structure. 1
75
i. The 1953 Foreword
Mark DeWolfe Howe's Harvard Law Review Foreword predated by
exactly thirty years the publication of N&N. Like Cover's Foreword, Howe's
was interdisciplinary in its focus. But while Cover's N&N would reach out to
connect with writings in many disciplines, and to connect many of those to law
or to legal theory, Howe's Foreword included only one field of study in
addition to law: political science. Writing in 1953, Howe felt the need to offer
something of an apology for his step toward political theory; he asks to be
"forgiven," because of his status as an "academic lawyer," for "concern[ing]
himself with a problem of political theory rather than a problem of
constitutional law."'' 76 That apology may have seemed, to Howe, particularly
necessary because the Supreme Court's 1952 Term had been one of unusual
legal moment.
Howe notes that in its 1952 Term, "the Court had before it the tragic drama
of the Rosenbergs and was confronted with that greatest domestic challenge to
American statesmanship--racial segregation in education."' 7 7 But Mark Howe
offers no further comment and not even any citation with regard to the
Rosenbergs and to Brown v. Board of Education.178 The legal liberalism within
which Howe wrote in the 1950s was not a site of deep critique. It was leftist
in the sense that Democrats were considered to be leftists during
the fifties. The shadow of the McCarthy hysteria was heavy over
Cambridge then. And my father, unlike some others, was
outspoken and very courageous. But he was a solid Truman
175. HOWE, supra note 39, at 47.
176. Howe, supra note 171, at9l.
177. Id.
178. The Supreme Court in June 1953 had specified to the parties in the Brown case questions to be
briefed for hearing at the start of the following term. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972
(1953). The efforts of Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Rosenberg to obtain a stay of execution of their death
sentences had been rejected by the United States Supreme Court for the final time on the evening of
June 19, 1953, hours before they were put to death. See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273
(1953). The erasure of Ethel Rosenberg's name from the caption of this case should be noted. For
discussion of Law and Literature and the Rosenberg case, with a focus on Ethel Rosenberg, see Marie
Ashe, The Bell Jar and the Ghost of Ethel Rosenberg, in SECRET AGENTS: THE ROSENBERG CASE,
MCCARTHYISM, AND FIFTIES AMERICA 215 (Maijorie Garber & Rebecca L. Walkowicz eds., 1995).
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Democrat. 79 Nor was the Fifties America during which Mark Howe wrote
his Foreword a place of broad equalities. Harvard was very privileged
during the forties and fifties, so male. The Matthiessen book
[F.O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in
the Age of Emerson and Whitmanl: an intellectual and poetic
Renaissance minus Emily Dickinson. Minus Harriet Beecher
Stowe. Minus Margaret Fuller. Of course, minus Frederick
Douglass as well. Women weren't the only ones subtracted.... I
can't quite so simply say I grew up in a false community-a
community that fancied itself as liberal.... But you see, it was
false If you were a girl or a woman who was not content to be
considered second-rate.
8 0
Not lingering over Brown or the Rosenberg matters, Mark Howe instead
selected for his focus a case about church and state: Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral.18' The subject-matter parallel to N&N is immediately apparent in
the common focus on law and religion. But the parallel goes beyond that. Like
Cover, Howe chooses to focus on a story that is specifically about patriarchal
power. While the central narrative for N&N is Biblical primogeniture, Howe's
Foreword treats the scope of (literally) patriarchal power, with the "patriarch"
in question being the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow.'8 2 In Howe's
example, competing claims would be evaluated in terms of their connection to
a patrilineage--"whether the appointment of Benjamin by the Patriarch or the
election of the Archbishop for North America by the convention of the
American churches validly selects the ruling hierarch for the American
churches.' 83
Kedroff involved a challenge to a New York statute that had ,transferred
control of the property of the Russian Orthodox Church, taking it away from an
Archbishop who had been appointed by the church in Moscow and vesting it
with an Archbishop who had been chosen by the Orthodox Church located in
the United States (which had separated itself from the Russian hierarchy). The
Supreme Court found the New York statute unconstitutional., Yet, what
interested Howe was that the Court had surprisingly not employed an
Establishment Clause analysis, but rather had based its decision upon an
interpretation of the meaning of "religious liberty." The Kedroff majority
defined this constitutionally-protected "liberty" as existing not in individual
members of the Church, but in the Russian Orthodox Church itself; what was
wrong with the New York statute, according to the Kedroff Court, was that it
179. Talisman Interview, supra note 21, at 159.
180. Id.
181. Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
182. Id. at 98.
183. Id. at 96-97.
184. Id. at 107.
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"directly prohibited the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right." 185  Howe
understands the Court to have meant that "the Church as a spiritual body has
liberties which will be given protection directly rather than derivatively, but it
gives that protection to liberties which, in their essence, differ from those
possessed by the members of the Church."' 86 It is the Court's location of
religious liberty rights in the religious "group" that motivates Howe's excursion
into political theory.
In developing his argument that the Court in Kedroff was adopting a
particular theory of political science, Howe suggests that Justice Reed, writing
for the Kedroff majority, may have been convinced "that liberties of every type
are best secured through a commitment to pluralism, or... [that] pluralism
offers a peculiarly fitting set of principles for the resolution of issues of Church
and State[.]"' 87  Thus, his argument is that, in Kedroff, the Court made a
contribution to the "growth of political theory as well as to the substance of
constitutional law."' 188 In discussing Kedroffs recognition or construction of a
constitutionally-protected "ecclesiastical right," Howe highlights the
significance of this move by observing that the "liberty" being recognized and
protected is not a liberty of individuals. 89 He observes: "[T]he body which
secured protection in Kedroff was neither the New York corporation nor the
associated American members of the Church, but the international body of
believers. Not only has the Court recognized the liberty of the group as
something different from the individual liberties of its members but it has
extended this recognition to an international body with its home office for
spiritual government in a foreign country."'
' 90
Howe ventures to suggest that perhaps the Kedroff Court's move toward
religious pluralism could be justified by reference to the language of the First
Amendment itself. In support of this proposition, he cites, seemingly
uncritically, Justice Douglas' comment in Zorach v.Clauson that "We are a
religious people. ,,191 He also suggests that because of Establishment Clause
obstacles to governmental support of religion, "the Court may feel that it is
essential that other agencies of government than the state have effective powers
in religious matters. Accordingly, the Court may have been persuaded that a
185. Id. at 119.
186. Howe, supra note 171, at 92.
187. Id. at 93. Making this point, Howe reviews writings of John Figgis, a Scottish jurist who had
advocated recognition of a kind of "corporate liberty" of churches, and also writings of Figgis' secular
disciple, Harold Laski, whose notions of political pluralism had been framed to justify recognition of
group rights in non-religious entities such as labor unions and universities. Id.
188. Id. at 95.
189. Id. at 91-92.
190. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
191. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US 306, 313 (1952), cited in Howe, supra note 171, at 94 n.7. In
Zorach, the Court upheld public schools' "release time" programs, through which students were
permitted to be released from their schools at specified times during the school week in order to attend
religious classes offered and provided by religious denominations outside of the public school.
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church must enjoy prerogatives of sovereignty which are not to be conceded to
other social groups."'192 Howe's assessment of the merit of the Court's move in
Kedroff is not entirely unequivocal, 193 though his tone is generally quite
detached and "neutral." In commentary expressive of the limits of legal-realist
critical perspectives, Howe points to an American status-quo, a social reality of
preference for religion, noting: "In the winter of 1953, Americans, by and large,
showed small sympathy for the teacher suspected of Communist sympathies.
Later in the year the same Americans showed considerable concern for
suspected ministers."
' 194
Howe's exposition and analysis of the incorporation of a "pluralist theory"
by the Kedroff Court is notable for its seeming detachment. Howe does not
identify his own subject-position; he does not identify his own religious or
political perspectives. Howe does not make clear, for example, in the
Foreword, his own opinions with regard to religion and to religious
organizations. I emphatically insist it does matter who's
speaking. 195 [My father] worshipped the American Constitution.
It really was his faith.196 Howe does point to concerns of "non-believers,"
but he does so only to note that those preferences will likely have to yield to
large social forces: "Whether or not the non-believer approves of the sympathy
which popular opinion gives to churches as compared to other groups, or of the
special advantages which the law has given to churches, that sympathy and
those advantages stand as social and constitutional realities which the Court
may, and perhaps should appropriately recognize.".1
9 7
Although Howe's endorsement of the Kedroff court's move is somewhat
tentative, his attitude is certainly not strongly critical. He can, perhaps, be
properly characterized as a "straddler."' 98 While Howe's Foreword highlights
192. Howe, supra note 171, at 94. His comments here anticipate the contention that Howe will state
more broadly in THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS that a "de facto Establishment of Religion" exists
in the United States. See HOWE, supra note 2, at 11-12,
193. Id. at 93. Howe notes that the move might have comforted "the ghost of Figgis." Id. But he
notes, at the same time, that it might have troubled Laski because of its preference of non-religious
groups, its providing for religious groups greater rights than those enjoyed by non-religious groups. Id.
at 93-94.
194. Howe, supra note 171, at 94. Howe does not specify to which teacher and to which ministers
he is referring, apparently assuming that the 1953 reader will recognize those persons without their
having been named.
195. HOWE, supra note 39, at 20.
196. Talisman Interview, supra note 21, at 159. See also Joshua Glenn, Bewildered in Boston,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2004, at 2, available at www.boston.com/news/
globe/ideas/articles/2004/03/07/bewilderedinboston. Glenn quotes Fanny Howe, Mark Howe's
daughter and Susan Howe's sister: "My parents were ironic and witty about everything.... Although
their 'materialist-skeptical' view, as I've come to call it, was seductive, I rebelled against it and adhered
instead to an 'invisible-faithful' view." Id. Glenn characterizes this outlook of Fanny. Howe as
amounting to "an optimistic political-religious belief in both a future social utopia and a divine scheme
for the world." Id.
197. Howe, supra note 171, at 94 (emphasis added).
198. Howe characterized himself this way in his later writing. See HOWE, supra note 2, at 139
("Straddlers, like me, search out new grounds of technical criticism with which to belabor the Court.").
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connections between Supreme Court opinion and political theory, he does not
take a stand that either strongly supports or strongly critiques the move that he
perceives the Court to have taken when it recognized "group" constitutional
rights in the Russian Orthodox Church. His adoption of a much more explicitly
positive posture-going beyond acceptance to active encouragement of the
Court's recognition of special constitutional protections for religious groups-
would occur twelve years later, with the 1965 publication of The Garden and
the Wilderness.
ii. The Garden and the Wilderness
The Garden and the Wilderness is a 180-page book dedicated to the
examination of the history, in American thought and in constitutional law, of
the metaphor of the "wall of separation between church and state." That
metaphor, first invoked by the United States Supreme Court in 1878, in
Reynolds v. United States,199 was subsequently invoked frequently during the
post-World War II years, during which the Court articulated a broad
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.2 °0 [My fatheri wrote a book
about American law called The Garden and The Wilderness.
Now, most books about the period and place must hesitate over
the word wilderness. Because it wasn't a wilderness to Native
Americans. Still, it's a resonant typological word. A necessary
emblem.0
In the Establishment Clause cases of the mid-twentieth century, as in
Reynolds, the Court cited the 1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptists, in which
Thomas Jefferson had used the "wall of separation" metaphor to gloss the
meaning of both the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should "make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and
State .... 202
"Sovereignty" has been an important concept in American constitutional law,
and it continues to be. Even today, "dueling" visions of sovereignty contend in
199. Reynolds v United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
200. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The majority in Everson had opined,
in the portion of its holding of most interest to Howe, because of its extension of constitutional
protection to non-religious people: "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Id. at
18.
201. Talisman Interview, supra note 21, at 161.
202. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, 16 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 282 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1904).
[Vol. 18: 1
Beyond Nomos and Narrative
203the Supreme Court. Outside the U.S. Reports, however, other
understandings surface. Amerindians found, to their cost, trust in the
code word 'sovereign' could mean all or nothing.... Dickinson
takes sovereignty away from God and bestows it on the Woods.
204
The Garden and the Wilderness was published in 1965, at a point when,
according to Mark DeWolfe Howe, the opinion expressed by Justice Douglas in
Zorach-that "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being"205-had given way to the "new Douglas doctrine" of Engel v
Vitale.
20 6
In Engel v. Vitale, the Court invoked the "wall of separation" metaphor,
interpreting the Establishment Clause as prohibiting prayer in public schools.
Mark DeWolfe Howe was troubled by this new doctrine, because, as he argued,
this doctrinal change took place without the Court's explicitly acknowledging
it. Against this background, The Garden and the Wilderness interrogates the
Court's use of the Jeffersonian metaphor.
Mark DeWolfe Howe's argument is that the Court need not have relied on
the Jeffersonian understanding of separation-an understanding that expressed
political principles of Enlightenment rationalism and of anticlericalism.
Rather, the same metaphor could as well-or better-have been traced to
Roger Williams' earlier expression of a theological principle that insists upon
protecting the "garden" of "the church" against encroachments by the
"wilderness" of the "world., 20 7 Schismatic children of Adam thought
they were leaving the "wilderness of the world" to find a haven
free of institutional structures they had united against. They were
unprepared for the variability of directional change the
203. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 109 HARv.
L. REv. 78 (1995).
204. HowE, supra note 3, at 80.
205. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 US 306, 313 (1952), cited in Howe, supra note 171, at 94 n.7.
206. Engel v Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For Mark DeWolfe Howe's discussion of this case, see
HowE, supra note 2, at 13-15.
207. See ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTrTON'S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND ANSWERED
(1644), reprinted in ROGER WILLIAMS: His CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 89, 98 (Perry
Miller ed., 1953), cited in HowE, supra note 2, at 5. Roger Williams, in contrasting "the garden" of "the
church" with "the wilderness" of "the world," argued in favor of separation in order to maintain the
purity of the church: "if He will ever please to restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity
be walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be saved out of the world are
to be transplanted out of the wilderness of the world and added unto his church or garden." WILLIAMS,
supra, at 98. Mark DeWolfe Howe speculates that the twentieth-century Court preferred the Jeffersonian
interpretation-separation in order to protect civil society from the church-because of its attachment to
the values of skepticism and confidence that were resonating positively in American culture at that time.
This choice, however, Howe insists, reflected a distorted reading of American history:
Today's Court has found it easy to assume that the framers of the First Amendment intended
to keep alive that bias of the Enlightenment which asserted that government must not give its
aid in any form to religion lest impious clerks tighten their grip upon the purses and the
minds of men.... It is hard for the present generation of emancipated Americans to conceive
the possibility that the framers of the Constitution were willing to incorporate some
theological presuppositions in the framework of federal government.
HowE, supra note 2, at 7-8.
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wilderness they reached represented. Even John Winthrop
complained of "our wildernes troubles in our first plantings"2 8
First-generation leaders of this hegira to new England tied
themselves and their followers to a dialectical construction of the
American land as a virgin garden preestablished for them by the
Author and Finisher of creation.20 9  The invocation of a solely
Jeffersonian justification of "separation," Howe argues, erases both the history
and the contemporary reality (in the year 1965) of the strongly respectful
attitudes toward religion consistently prevalent in American society and
culture. 2 10 Why is the church compared to a garden?211 The Court's
reliance solely on the Enlightenment-model of separation, and its consequent
misreading of history, has important contemporary consequences. Amplifying
the legal-realist perspectives earlier expressed in his Foreword, Howe identifies
the core problem: "By building constitutional law upon history thus simplified,
the Court has widened the gap between current social reality and current
constitutional law." 212 The "current social reality" to which Howe is referring
here is one that includes an American history of sympathy for religion-
sympathy strong enough that it had produced "what may fairly be described as
a defacto establishment of religion.,
21 3
Howe's motivating concern in The Garden and the Wilderness was to
interrupt the course being taken by the Court in post-Zorach years and to
correct the "disreputable history" of the Religion Clauses of the First
214Amendment. Much of the book is therefore devoted to exploring matters
overlooked or avoided by the Court, namely, the historical "conditions which
begat the prohibitions of the First Amendment."' 215 Howe believed that the
Court's mistaken interpretation of American history might be largely
attributable to its desire-throughout constitutional history, but most strikingly
during the twenty-five years prior to the publication of The Garden and the
Wilderness-to protect and advance the value of equality. That concern, he
suggests, led the Court to force an interpretation of the non-Establishment
Clause as requiring equality, or governmental neutrality, not only among all
religions, but also between religion and non-religion.216  This equality-
208. HOWE, supra note 39, at 48, citing THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, supra note 42, at 201.
209. HOWE, supra note 39, at 49.
210. The Court, Howe says, particularly in the school "release-time" and prayer cases of the early
1960s, treated the Religion Clauses as expressions of purely Enlightenment values. But the historical
reality is that the First Amendment codified both "the believing affirmations of Roger Williams" and
"the questioning doubts of Thomas Jefferson." HowE, supra note 2, at 9.
211. HowE, supra note 39, at 55.
212. HOWE, supra note 2, at 10-11.
213. Id. at II.
214. Id. at 16.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 149-155.
[Vol. 18: 1
Beyond Nomos and Narrative
mandating interpretation of the Religion Clauses, he insists, is not warranted by
history.
217
Howe's critique of the court's reading of the Religion Clauses, particularly
in* the various public education cases, 218 does not involve a criticism of the
outcome of those cases. He takes care to assure his readers that he believes the
cases produced sound outcomes by prohibiting prayer and Bible-reading to
protect certain interests of non-religious school children and their parents.
219
However, he wants to stress that the protections of non-religious individuals
should be based not on grounds defined by the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment (whether free exercise or non-establishment) but on alternative
constitutional grounds (such as First Amendment Free Speech, Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection, or Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
protections of liberty and property).220 Howe suggests that the Court might
have more forthrightly acknowledged that it was committing itself to furthering
the "movement toward equality" that has been recognized as a national goal
from the "outset of our national existence." 221 Nonetheless, the central purpose
of Howe's argument in The Garden and the Wilderness is not to justify and
develop the equality claims of individuals, but to valorize the claims of
religious groups.
Some of the parallels between Howe and Cover have already been
suggested: Each authored a Foreword dedicated to law and religion issues that
involved claims rooted in patriarchy; each introduced interdisciplinary work;
each treated a particular case primarily to illustrate a theory derived from
interdisciplinary consideration. Beyond the parallels demonstrating influence,
Cover's engagement with each of the two Howe writings outlined here suggests
that he consciously attempted, in N&N, to overcome Howe's influence through
his own originality.
This posture is evident in N&N's reading of Howe's Foreword. Cover
agrees with Howe's recognition that judicial interpretations are not privileged.
He approves what he characterizes as Howe's appreciation of the need for the
judiciary to protect the "norm-generating autonomy" of groups222-to protect
groups' "liberty" not merely "to be" but also "to create and interpret law."
223
Perhaps prompted by enthusiasm for the concept of religious group sovereignty
that he will himself assert, Cover actually provides a mistaken rendering of
Howe's Foreword position regarding the sovereignty of groups: Cover
mischaracterizes that position as more akin to his own than it actually is. Thus,
217. Id. at 156.
218. See e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
219. HOWE, supra note 2, at 173.
220. Id. at 159-167.
221. Id. at 158.
222. Cover, supra note 1, at 32.
223. Id.
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Cover characterizes as Howe's opinion the proposition that "government must
recognize that it is not the sole possessor of sovereignty and that private
groups... are entitled to... exercise within the area of their competence an
authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority. 224
But Howe did not in fact state, in his Foreword, any such position
unequivocally favoring the autonomy of religious groups. Howe had been quite
precise in his writing. The interesting thing about my father was, he
was obsessed by footnotes.... I grew up with my father's "So-
and-so wrote a very bad footnote," or "That footnote was wrong,"
or "The way the English Rut footnotes on the Rage is much better
than the Americans"-with frantic worry over footnotes and
bibliographies.225 Cover reads into Howe's Foreword something that was
actually not there, effectively claiming a stronger relationship to Howe than
actually existed; this amounts to an unfounded claim by Cover that Howe
agreed with a central theme of N&N: the privileging of religious group
autonomy.
By exaggerating his resemblance to his predecessor in legal theory, Cover
misreads Howe. But Cover also writes to explicitly distance himself from the
intellectual father's influence, criticizing Howe for not having gone far enough
in The Garden and the Wilderness. Cover criticizes Howe for failing to
elaborate upon a "largely undeveloped observation" 226 Howe had made about
the Court. Howe had written:
Among the stupendous powers of the Supreme Court of the United
States, there are two which in logic may be independent and yet in fact
are related. The one is the power, through an articulate search for
principle, to interpret history. The other is the power, through the
disposition of cases, to make it.... I must remind you, however, that a
great many Americans... tend to think that because a majority of the
justices have the power to bind us by their law they are also
empowered to bind us by their history. Happily that is not the case.
Each of us is entirely free to find his history in other places than the
pages of the United States Reports.
227
Cover reads this passage as an example of Howe's simultaneous notation
of and avoidance of the full range of complexity in the relationship of narrative
to law. Cover sums up:
224. Cover, supra note 1, at 32 n.93, cites Howe's Foreword, in which Howe stated: "The heart of
the pluralistic thesis is the conviction that government must recognize that it is not the sole possessor of
sovereignty and that private groups... are entitled to... exercise within the area of their competence an
authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority." Howe, supra note 171, at 91
(emphasis added). In his footnote, Cover implies that Howe stated this proposition about group
sovereignty as his own position, rather than merely describing it as "the pluralistic thesis."
225. Lynn Keller, An Interview with Susan Howe, 36 CONTEMP. LITERATURE 1, 27 (1995).
226. Cover, supra note 1, at 18.
227. HOWE, supra note 2, at 5, cited in Cover, supra note 1, at 19.
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The question Howe addressed concerned which narrative tradition
should inform the Court's decisions. What he did not write with
sufficient clarity is that, whichever story the Court chooses, alternative
stories still provide normative bases for the growth of distinct
constitutional worlds through the persistence of groups who find their
respective meanings for the first amendment in the radically different
starting points of Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson. In this
respect, as we shall see, the first amendment's religion clauses are not
atypical.22
Cover is here proposing that the interdisciplinarity of Howe's book is
insufficient; Cover argues that Howe's focus on history and contemporary
"social reality" avoids the directional differences that will be initiated not only
from the "radically different starting points" of Jefferson and Williams, but
from other different starting points by a multiplicity of contending groups, both
religious and non-religious. Cover wants to emphasize that neither any
authoritative history nor any sociological theory will settle conflicts of church
and state and that unending challenges will be brought by groups that take very
seriously-indeed as a matter of religious commitment-both the freedom and
the obligation to "find [their] history in other places than the pages of the
United States Reports."
229
I have proposed that the connection between Howe and Cover can be read
as one between intellectual father and son, and I have urged recognition that
230their intellectual relationship was marked by agonistic features. Cover's
explicit engagement with Howe's work includes a claim to have superceded
Howe's understandings. Cover claims that, in N&N, he has defined a model of
"law-creation" stronger than Howe's and a notion of "narrativity" so original as
to have escaped the realm of Howe's influence.
What Cover accomplished in N&N did exceed, in some respects, what
Howe had mapped out both in his Foreword and in The Garden and the
Wilderness. First, Cover went far beyond Howe in tapping into a broad range of
interdisciplinary perspectives to generate a model of "jurisgenesis." And
Cover's model of contending narratives is not limited either to the written texts
of history, political science, and law nor to the construction of an obdurate
"social reality" that can properly arrest the practice of critique of law. Those
elements of N&N highlight its unquestionable originality. Second, the degree
of personal commitment evident in N&N distinguishes that writing--as
writing-from Howe's. No reader of N&N would be likely to characterize
Cover-as Howe had characterized himself-as a "straddler., 231 In its breadth,
228. Cover, supra note 1, at 19.
229. HOWE, supra note 2, at 5.
230. See Cover, supra note 1, at 5 n.7.
231. HOwE, supra note 2, at 139; see supra note 198.
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in its quality of personal commitment, and in its vitality, N&N does surpass
Howe's work.
But while N&N evidences that Cover had partially removed himself from
certain constraints of Legal Realism, N&N also contributed, unfortunately, to
amplifying or compounding the move that Cover (mistakenly) thought Howe
had made, by specifically privileging religious groups. Cover surpasses Howe
in his own uncritical readiness to claim constitutional protection for religious
groups per se, to afford religious groups constitutional protections not available
to other groups, and to overlook the problem of equality involved in that move.
Certainly, Howe had perceived the Supreme Court as offering that kind of
preference in Kedroff through its interpretation of free exercise as protecting
groups, and he did not criticize that preference. Cover, on the other hand, saw
the Court in Bob Jones University as not having taken that step, and, on that
basis, he characterized the Court as having failed its judicial responsibility. In
The Garden and the Wilderness, while urging that the Religion Clauses do not
offer sound bases for the protection of non-religious persons, Howe remained
careful to identify the necessity of extending such protections on other
constitutional grounds and proposed alternative bases on which those
protections might rest. Cover, however, evidences no concern whatsoever
about the many forms of inequality that may be produced by affording
governmental preferences to religious groups. Cover fails to push the inquiry
into equality even as far as Howe had taken it in The Garden and the
Wilderness, nearly twenty years prior to the publication of N&N.
Not showing a concern about "equality" as careful as Howe's, Cover
justifies the privileging of religious groups by ascribing to religious groups the
capacity for generating alternative nomoi that might constructively challenge
existing law. Cover's privileging, however, is deeply problematic; it relies on
assumptions that largely erase the reality of religious groups' destructive
potential. Moreover, it entirely fails to recognize as problematic the degree to
which religious groups contribute to the continuing inequality of "non-
religious" people (that is, people not affiliated with religious groups) and of
women even when they are "religious."
It has been noted, above, that Cover's valorization of "ecclesiastical
liberty" can occlude the claims to protection that might be asserted by
individuals within a particular religious group; that Cover is interested in
internal division only to the degree that it relates to the issue of normative
conflict between a particular religious group and the civil government; and that
he does not engage with the meanings of internal divisions for individuals
within the religious group. But when Cover avoids encounter with the reality of
this issue, he is executing precisely the same move that he criticized when it
was made by Howe: the move of simultaneously noting a reality and refusing
to pursue its implications. Cover fails to engage with what it means to
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constitutionally privilege religious groups that themselves have long histories
of practicing exclusion, banishment, excommunication, abuse, and other
discriminatory treatment of individuals. This is a serious omission in a work
focused on American law and on a history of American religion-a history that
that developed out of Massachusetts Bay. Antinomians. Separatists, and
Quakers (often inspired and led by women) were summarily
silenced, or driven from the borders of this modern Canaan.232
The failure to consider American antinomianism is extraordinarily striking in a
work with a focus on nomos. And Cover's uncritical valorization of religious
groups entirely overlooks the reality of the often gendered nature of such
groups' exclusions and banishments.
During the years since Cover advocated the privileging "ecclesiastical
liberty," and particularly since 1990, Congress and state legislatures have
enacted a plethora of statutes privileging religious groups and religious
233individuals. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan has recently highlighted a problem
with privileging "religious" claims: American law has no coherent basis for
distinguishing between "religion" and "non-religion." 234 Sullivan has pointed
out that claims asserted on the basis of conscientious conviction, without
reference to membership in churches, or without a claim that conduct is
required by the tenets of a particular religious group, may be rejected in ways
that amount to dis-preferencing of individual conscience. 235  This reality is
somewhat shocking in an American culture in which increasing numbers of
people report being unaffiliated with institutionalized religion.
236
Beyond the dis-privileging of individual conscience claims (as opposed to
religious group claims), it is troubling to see the value of "ecclesiastical liberty"
vaunted in N&N and made available for invocation by religious groups whose
policies and practices involve egregious gender-based discriminations. This
concern is not a symbolic or abstract one. The notion of "ecclesiastical liberty"
recognized by Howe and by Cover has taken on a life of its own in American
232. HOWE, supra note 3, at 39. N&N's merely passing reference to Anne Hutchinson has already
been noted. See Cover, supra note 1, at 16 n.41, 23 n.66.
233. I am referring here to the statutes that have been enacted to restore religious freedom and to
undo the force of the wall of separation metaphor, largely in response to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Congressional acts have included the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994); the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994); "charitable choice" legislation including
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2001). A fine discussion of both state
and national legislation is provided in MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2005).
234. See generally WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2005).
235. Id. at 138-159.
236. See Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference:
Politics and Generations, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 165 (2002).
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law. It has, this year, been apparent in Massachusetts, in the political process
through which the Catholic Church, in association with other religious groups,
defeated proposed legislation that would have required churches-like other
non-profit entities-to make their financial records available for inspection by
237the Commonwealth's Attorney General. The troubling nature of the
"ecclesiastical liberty" has also recently become apparent, as the principle has
been invoked defensively in cases of torts-particularly cases involving the
238sexual abuse of children--perpetrated by members of the clergy. It has also
become evident in accounts of American law's protection of Amish insularity
and in the degree to which this protection has permitted incest to escape the
reach of the criminal law. 239 My argument here is that entirely insufficient
attention has been given to the ways in which the privileging of religious
groups contributes to the persistence of social inequality among group
members, and particularly for women. N&N's active participation in that
privileging process makes highly problematic the proposal that it be included in
the Law and Literature canon.
The engagement of Cover with Howe's work makes it appropriate to
characterize Howe as Cover's intellectual father-a father whom Cover
adopted and claimed as his immediate predecessor and progenitor in the world
of legal theory involving law, society (or the "normative universe"), and
religion. It would be not at all difficult to trace the male lineage back to an
earlier generation and to connect both Cover and Howe with the most pre-
eminent figure of American legal pragmatism, Oliver Wendell Holmes. 24° And
that genealogical tracing would clearly locate Cover's work as continuous with
the patrilinearity of American legal liberalism elaborated during the twentieth
century in the movements of pragmatism and legal realism.
Wallace Stevens, a major American poet of the twentieth century whose
poetry serves as the epigram for N&N, has also been attached to the intellectual
currents of these traditions, 24 and the other major influence, whom Cover
237. For a chronology of this process, see Frank Phillips, Bill Would Force Church to Disclose Its
Finances, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2005, at 1; Michael Paulson, Faith Leaders Ally Against Financial
Disclosure Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1362604; Adrian Walker,
Reasonfor Anger, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1424132.
238. Sexual abuse scandals have afflicted the Catholic Church and other denominations and have
received extensive media coverage in the past few years. For summary and discussion, see HAMILTON,
supra note 233, at 238-72. See also Jeffrey Anderson et al., When Clergy Fail Their Flock: Litigating
the Clergy Sexual Abuse Cases, 91 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 151 (2005).
239. See Nadya Labi, The Gentle People, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2005, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/feature-labijanfeb5.msp.
240. Regarding the Howe-Holmes connection, see supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
241. See Cover, supra note 1, at 4 n.1, citing WALLACE STEVENS, Connoiseur of Chaos, in THE
COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 215 (1954). See also THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE
STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY 103 (1991) (noting that "if'the poet Stevens speaks
to lawyers, it is to teach us pragmatic philosophy"). See also Grey's consideration of the often
androgynous and sometimes "feminine" voice of Wallace Stevens, id. at 48-49, and Susan Howe's
commentary on the "feminine" in the work of poet Charles Olson, supra note 167 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 18: 1
Beyond Nomos and Narrative
explicitly acknowledges as close kin, is James Boyd White, the "founding
father" of the contemporary Law and Literature project.242 White's book, The
Legal Imagination,243 published at the time of Cover's writing, is highly
original and has a kind of sui generis quality; it would be reductive to pigeon-
hole it under the heading of legal liberalism that identifies so much of Cover's
intellectual lineage. Nonetheless, White's work at the time of publication of
N&N, and for years thereafter, did resemble the works of the "legal liberalism"
school in its focus on male authors and its lack of attention to women and to
women's writings. While White's Law and Literature work commenced in
1973 with publication of The Legal Imagination, it was only twenty-one years
later that White directed his attention to Emily Dickinson. 244  Not an
insignificant omission and delay: Dickinson is a poet of the order of
Shelley and Holderlin. She is one of the greatest poets who ever
wrote in EngUsh. The trace of her unauprehended passage
through letters disturbs the order of a world where commerce is
reality and authoritative editions freeze poems into artifacts.
241
Yet, not an entirely surprising omission and delay. Emily Dickinson has been
long overlooked. In 1941, Emily Dickinson is a blank in F.O.
Matthiessen's American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the
Age of Emerson and Whitman 46 Both Emily Dickinson and Gertrude
Stein, major experimental writers, have received slight attention in American
literary criticism. To this day canonical criticism from Harold
Bloom to Hugh Kenner persists in dropping their names and
ignoring their work.24 7
Within legal theory in 1983, N&N seemed quite singular in its invitation of
new narratives. At the same time, the invitation extended by N&N recorded its
own preference of group narratives over individual narratives, excluded
individual narratives while privileging group narratives, and almost entirely
excluded narratives by or about women. Howe's writing had not manifested
any concern about inequalities experienced by women in particular. There
was the sense, I suppose from my father, that because I was
feminine, anything would do except law or history. Those
disciUlines were for men. Civil rights activist he was, yet he was
adamantly opposed to women being admitted to Harvard Law
242. See Jacqueline St. Joan & Annette Bennington McElhiney, Introduction to BEYOND PORTIA,
supra note 6, at 1 ("The law and literature movement generally is identified as starting with the 1973
publication of James Boyd White's The Legal Imagination."). For a fine study of White's work, see
JEANNE GAAKEER, HOPE SPRINGS ETERNAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF JAMES BOYD WHITE
(1998). See also Cover's acknowledgment of White's influence, Cover, supra note 1, at 6 n. 10.
243. WHITE, supra note 27.
244. See James Boyd White, Dickinson's Poetry: Transforming the Authority of Language, in ACTS
OF HOPE 224 (J. B. White ed., 1994).
245. HOWE, supra note 39, at 19.
246. Id. at 28.
247. HowE, supra note 3, at 11.
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School. He thought standards would plunge immediately if they
were. 24 And Cover did not himself manifest in N&N any concern whatsoever
about the unequal treatment of women supported by religious groups or about
the advancement of women's equality through constitutional interpretation.
Feminist criticism has for two decades or more pointed to exclusions or
omissions or elisions that erase women's experiences. These omissions are
now widely recognized as bases for indictment in themselves. Such omissions
mark the inadequacy of the content of N&N. Beyond the limitation of content
based on gender exclusivity, N&N is a work that lacks significant relevance for
the development of legal theory in the present and in the future. This second
limitation of N&N has to do with the method of its reading of the texts that it
did consider and its failure to embody the kind of "different reading," informed
by critical theory, that is called for by the exigencies of the present times.
III. UNCONVERTED ANTINOMIANISM IN THE WORK OF SUSAN HOWE
Parts I and II of this Article have been interrupted by the words of Susan
Howe. I have attempted to indicate, through my inclusion of Howe's words,
the force of her consciously gendered approach to the relationships between
insular religious groups and the individual members of those groups-
especially women. This final Part turns to a more expository account of Susan
Howe's writing, in order to examine and explicate its relevance for legal theory
in general and its relevance in particular for work relating to matters of religion
and gender.
A key question for such a critical reading involves subject-position: Who is
speaking? Howe appreciates the centrality of this question: I cannot
murmur indifferently: "What matter who's speaking?" I
emphaticaly insist it does matter who's speaking. 249 Susan Howe
makes no secret of her own subject-position, identifying herself as a woman, a
poet, a North American, an interdisciplinarian, and a daughter of a major
American liberal-legal theorist. In my reading I have come to feel that Howe is
well characterized, in words with which she herself characterized Emily
Dickinson, as an "unconverted antinomian. ' 25° Her writings, precisely because
they express her "unconverted antinomianism," have already been recognized
as powerful contributions to the study of gender and religion in American
literary history. My purpose here is to identify the equally powerful
contribution they offer for the study of gender and religion in American legal
thought.
248. Susan Howe, Interview with Janet Ruth Falon, Fragments toward autobiography, 3:2
Difficulties 28, 29 (1989).
249. HOWE, supra note 39, at 20.
250. Id. at 140.
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In their article, Heilbrun and Resnik lamented the absence of work relating
to women in the canon of law and literature. Reviewing the history of feminist
literary criticism and providing an account of writings through which women's
perspectives had become incorporated into literary criticism, Heilbrun
commented ruefully on the oddness of having to recite that history for law and
literature readers at a time when it was already very well understood by
students of literature. Commenting on the development of "feminist literary
criticism," Heilbrun noted, with particular regret, the "virtual absence of its
mark on law and literature," 251 or the failure of writing in the Law and
Literature school to be informed by feminist perspectives. She identified as the
''central issues facing feminist studies":
the definition of gender; the definition of women; the importance of
race and class; the interpretation of sexuality and of work; the
legitimacy of the personal as women havebegun increasingly to use it
in critical studies; and the conflict between theoretical feminism and
political action.
252
Heilbrun's definition of the work to be done in informing both feminist
studies and Law and Literature, particularly her identification of pertinent
questions of gender, sexuality, race, and class, as well as general questions
about "women," remains timely. The issues she identified continue to be
central. A still further issue that Heilbrun did not identify-one that has now,
with the recent "return of religions," emerged as critically important for legal
theory-involves the intersection of gender and law with religion.21 In further
commentary on the limitations of the Law and Literature school, Heilbrun
noted its failure to have become informed by the poststructuralist literary-
critical perspectives and strategies that by 1990 had already strongly influenced
literary criticism outside legal studies. Heilbrun cited this lack as an
impediment to the production of what Resnik would call "different writings"
and "different readings.,
254
Echoing each of the concerns that Heilbrun expressed, in my reading of
N&N up to this point, I have identified features of that work that necessarily
mark it as problematic, because of its omission of feminist-or, more broadly,
"gendered"--perspectives. I have examined focal points of N&N at which
251. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 25.
252. Id. at 26.
253. For commentary on the revival or return of religion, see the five-volume THE
FUNDAMENTALIST PROJECT (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1995), which consists of
separate volumes entitled: FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED (1991); FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY:
RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY AND EDUCATION (1993); FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE
STATE: REMAKING POLITIES, ECONOMIES AND MILITANCE (1993); ACCOUNTING FOR
FUNDAMENTALISMS: THE DYNAMIC CHARACTER OF MOVEMENTS (1994); and FUNDAMENTALISM
COMPREHENDED (1995). For an account of the emergence of religion as a strong political force in
American law in the early 1980s, see generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History
of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001).
254. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 31-32.
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women's experiences and women's work could have received attention. I have
highlighted N&N's unconscious genderings: its foregrounding of particular
texts and its ignoring others; its considering certain stories of male relationships
while ignoring stories of women and their family and kinship connections; and
its invoking a broad array of interdisciplinary writings by men while "resisting
the temptation" to engage with relevant contributions by women in the same
fields. And, while doing these things, I have argued that N&N consistently
situates women in positions of marginality or virtual invisibility and that for
this reason alone, Cover's writing clearly cannot be seen as an example of the
different writing (inclusive of women) for which Resnik calls.
Taking up the Heilbrun criticism that focuses on Law and Literature's
omission of poststructuralist perspectives, in this Part, I will explicitly
demonstrate how N&N lacks the requisite features to be a different reading, and
I will argue that Resnik's continuing commendation of the essay255 seems
inconsistent with the insights that Heilbrun expressed in their jointly-authored
essay.256 More importantly, the extolling of N&N can be seen as emblematic of
the resistance to postmodemist perspectives that has characterized American
liberal-legal theory in the decades since Cover wrote. Notably, the
postmodemist approaches recommended by Heilbrun continue to be expressed
with infrequency in Law and Literature writings and in legal studies relating to
religion and gender.
The remainder of this Article responds to Heilbrun's advocacy of
poststructuralist reading and writing strategies. I begin by considering
Heilbrun's recommendations in general and by identifying and examining some
recent contributions to legal theory that do show increasing recognition of the
possibilities that can be opened up by the moves she endorses. Secondly, I
discuss Susan Howe's work as an instance of postmodernist critical practice.
Pointing to ways in which Howe's work exceeds Cover's and achieves a
greater extrication from the limits of legal-liberalism, I advocate her particular
relevance for Law and Literature and for studies focused on law's intersection
with gender and with religion.
A. Deconstruction in Law and Literature
In her 1990 comments on the Law and Literature movement, Heilbrun
expressed regret and surprise that Law and Literature appeared not to have
benefited from the exposure to poststructuralist theory that had already greatly
enriched literary criticism, particularly feminist literary criticism. Heilbrun
noted specifically that: "The use by feminist critics of French theory brought
great theoretical sophistication to the genre, as did the works of the French
255. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 53.
256. See generally Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6.
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masters Foucault, Lacan, and especially Derrida, who introduced
deconstruction." 257 Heilbrun regretted finding no comparable enrichment of
writings in Law and Literature. She continued:
[T]he really bad old days of literary criticism [exclusive of women's
perspectives] have been left further behind by literature than by legal
studies. Feminist criticism and poststructuralist criticism have had
almost twenty years in which to perfect theories and techniques, and to
revise ideas of what to read and what to value. Surely law could well
benefit from the fruits of those two decades, both in the reading of the
new literature by women and in the reading and interpretation of texts
not usually read in law classes.
258
In the years that have passed since 1990, poststructuralism-in both its
Continental and American versions-has certainly found some place in
American legal theory. A major event in the turn of legal studies toward
poststructuralist thought occurred with the Cardozo University Law School
Conference of 1989, at which Jacques Derrida delivered his Force of Law
lecture,259 insisting upon the necessity of deconstruction for law and insisting
that "[d]econstruction is justice. 260  Since then, some incorporations of
deconstruction and other poststructuralist perspectives into feminist legal
writing have occurred, but they have not been typical or representative of the
dominant strains in legal writing that define themselves as feminist, or in Law
and Literature writings, or in legal theory in general: The failure of most
American feminist legal thought to engage meaningfully with deconstruction
has persisted; it has been noted by American commentators261 and has been
noted, with some recent frequency, by non-American feminist legal scholars
involved with Law and Literature.
262
This widespread failure of American legal theory---evident even in
feminist legal studies and in Law and Literature-to engage with the
perspectives of deconstruction unquestionably has something to do with the
editorial control of legal writing, with the extremely traditional attributes of law
review writing, for example, and with review editors' resistance to change.
263
257. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 26.
258. Id. at 25.
259. Derrida, supra note 57.
260. Id. at 945.
261. See Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring for Deconstruction, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85 (2000);
Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2001); Marie
Ashe, Book Review, Inventing Choreographies: Feminism and Deconstruction, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1123 (1990) [hereinafter Ashe, Inventing Choreographies]; Ashe, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note
18.
262. See, e.g., Anne Orford, Critical Intimacy: Jacques Derrida and the Friendship of Politics, 6
GERMAN L.J. 31 (2005); Nina Philadelphoff-Puren & Peter Rush, Fatal (F)laws: Law, Literature and
Writing, 14 LAW & CRITIQUE 191 (2003); Nina Philadelphoff-Puren, Exhibiting the Hymen: The Blank
Page Between Law and Literature (unpublished manuscript, Ctr. for Comparative Literature and
Cultural Studies, Monash University, 2003).
263. Heilbrun and Resnik comment on one instance of this resistance. They were able to persuade
their Yale Law Journal editors, in 1990, to permit their including both first and last names of authors in
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More deeply, it has to do with the anxiety about the potential loss of
normativity triggered by postmodemism's anti-foundationalism. 264 This anxiety
often gives rise to a mistaken equation of philosophical anti-foundationalism
265with moral relativism. 6 In their Literary Criticisms of Law, Guyora Binder
and Robert Weisberg have suggested that sometimes writing that is not at all
relativist-for example, narrative writing outside the tradition of legal-
liberalism-will be mis-read by commentators unwilling to confront the
"unacceptably dangerous" implications of anti-foundationalism. 266
Some adventuresome legal writing has largely turned its back on theory.
267
But it remains the case that postmodernist thought is, as Ruthann Robson notes,
"the dominant intellectual discourse" of the present. 268 And it may be possible
to gather a sense of the richness and promise offered by postmodernist theory
by considering some recent commentaries of contributors who are both
informed by deconstructive perspectives and consciously alert to issues of
gender. Anne Orford, for example, who has written about international law and
globalization, 269 has recently expressed appreciation for what she has learned
through "reading Derrida., 270  Orford takes as given "[t]he inability to find a
single authority to ground or guarantee the wholeness of the law is a condition
of late modernity. Most modem law works by burying the knowledge of this
lack at its foundation."271 Regarding the value of Derrida for this "condition,"
she notes: "Derrida offered me a lesson in how to be surprised by the world.
citations (which constituted a departure from "legal footnote conventions"), but they were not successful
in obtaining permission to include the full names of the parties in the cases they discussed: "The
exclusions of litigants' first names reinforces their facelessness and genderlessness, but we were unable
to persuade the editors to alter this convention." Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 41.
264. Stanley Fish is identified by Carolyn Heilbrun as an "exception" among male writers in Law
and Literature, in that he had "allowed feminist contributions in literary studies to affect his writing and
thinking." Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 22, citing STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES
(1989). Fish has seemed to take pleasure in a teasing of legal-liberalists with titles calculated to alarm.
See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too
(1994); STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999); Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible:
Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997) [hereinafter,
Mission Impossible].
265. Richard Rorty rejects anxiety about "relativism" and urges that American pragmatism is able
to survive anti-foundationalist philosophical perspectives. See generally RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND
PROGRESS (1998); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
266. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 4, at 243-244 (reviewing Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and
the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989)).
267. See James R. Elkins, A Poetics - of and for - Ruthann Robson, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 363, 390
(2005) (referring to the "theory-weary"). An escape from theory-weariness has been evident in the
transformation of the Legal Studies Forum, under James Elkins's editorship, into a literary journal
featuring the prose and poetry of lawyer-writers. See, e.g., 29 LEGAL STUD. F. 1 (2005). See also
Gemmette, Law and Literature, supra note 11, at 682 (praising "story-telling" in Law and Literature for
its departure from "ambiguous and inaccessible texts of the Critical Legal Studies 'movement').
268. RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL 43 (1998), quoted in Elkins, supra note
267, at391.
269. See ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2003).
270. Orford, supra note 262, at 31.
271. Id. at33.
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Since reading Derrida, I have begun to find myself in a new relation to the
resources of language, and to hear words 'otherwise.' 272 With regard to the
promise of Derrida for gender concerns, Orford notes, characterizing the
writing of The Post Card:
273
Derrida here seems to me to accept the risks of seduction and to
recognize that reaching out to an other involves a loss of faith in a
whole, autonomous self. He fails to constitute himself as. an upright,
indifferent, reliable figure who masters himself, embraces the law and
is able to possess and thus exchange one feminized figure for another.
Instead, Derrida writes himself as an embodied, melancholy love, one
undone by his desire for the singular, unique other to whom all that he
writes is addressed. In doing this in a philosophical text, he shows a
lack of respect for the father's law, something very desirable in a
masculine body.274
Orford is not alone among legal feminists in her appreciation of Derrida.
Katherine Sheehan, for example, writing in 2000, thoughtfully identified
resistances to-and misunderstandings of-Derridean deconstruction in various
liberal-legal projects, including the feminist writing of Robin West.275 It
remains the case, however, that such deconstructive writings remain
exceptional, rather than typical, within feminist legal theory and in Law and
Literature. Most writing in these fields continues to be contained, as was N&N,
within the confines of a worn-out liberal legalism. But new directions for Law
and Literature will open up, as Heilbrun and others have now urged for many
years, only through the paths of postmodernism.
276
Apart from its value for legal theory in general and for perspectives on
gender in particular, deconstruction offers something different at a time in
which legal liberalism and multiculturalism appear threatened by-and
inadequate in the face of-religious divisions presenting themselves nationally
and globally. The lack of philosophical foundation for American law's liberal
tradition in general has been sharply critiqued. In particular, its approach to
"settling the just bounds between church and state" has been incontrovertibly
characterized as a "mission impossible" within the confines of liberal-
legalism's understanding of "tolerance." 277 At the start of the 21st Century,
alternative undertakings are needed. Jacques Derrida's attention to religion
272. Id. at 32.
273. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POST CARD: FROM SOCRATES TO FREUD AND BEYOND (Alan Bass
trans. 1987). I intend to contrast Derrida's posture, described here, with Cover's attitude of "resisting the
temptation" to engage with Carol Gilligan. See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
274. Orford, supra note 262, at 40.
275. See generally Sheehan, Caring for Deconstruction, supra note 261 (discussing, among other
writings, ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997)).
276. For argument that feminist legal theory cannot indefinitely avoid engagement with
poststructuralism see generally Ashe, Inventing Choreographies, supra note 261.
277. See Fish, Mission Impossible, supra note 264.
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becomes particularly noteworthy at this juncture.278 And Susan Howe's work,
with its direct focus on religion and on gender, becomes especially relevant.
B. Deconstruction and "Unconverted Antinomianism "
Susan Howe's work defies categorization by genre. It has been
characterized as experimental and "avant-garde," 279 and as constituting "acts of
non-conformity. ' 28° As far as I have been able to determine, Howe has not
been discussed within Law and Literature commentary, in spite of the wide
celebration that has elsewhere greeted her work. Howe has been elected to the
Board of Chancellors of the Academy of American Poets, a testament to her
high reputation as a poet. 281 Her writing has also been recognized for its
importance as history or as counter-history. In 1988, for example, James
Clifford cited My Emily Dickinson for its power to interrupt the "narrative
continuity of history and identity" in a determination to "find a different way
through capitalist America."282  Since then, Susan Howe has continued to
produce work of originality and force. The Birth-Mark: Unsettling the
Wilderness in American Literary History is one of several powerful writings
exploring the histories of American law and religion and literature. 283 Some of
Howe's subject matter coincides precisely with that of the Law and Literature
canon. For example, an excerpt from Herman Melville's Billy Budd appears as
284an epigraph to The Birth-Mark, and her essay Scattering as Behavior Toward
Risk can be read as a meditation on Captain Vere and Billy Budd.285 At the
same time, as suggested in Parts I and II, above, Howe engages with the
"barely legible" and often female-gendered texts of American religion and
American history.
A major theme of both My Emily Dickinson and The Birth-Mark is the
significance for American literature-and for women's writing-of the
religious and civil trials of Anne Hutchinson in the Massachusetts Bay Colony
in 1637. Howe reads and re-reads the trials and the banishment of Hutchinson,
278. See Jacques Der'ida, Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of
Reason Alone, in RELIGION (Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo eds., 1998) [hereinafter Derrida, Faith
and Knowledge.] See also the discussion of this work of Derrida in Ashe, Limits of Tolerance, supra
note 57.
279. KRZYSZTOF ZIAREK, "A Sounding of Uncertainty": Susan Howe's Poetic Gendering of
History, in THE HISTORICITY OF EXPERIENCE: MODERNITY, THE AVANT-GARDE AND THE EVENT 263
(2001).
280. Susan Schultz, Exaggerating History, 4 POSTMODERN CULTURE 2 (1994).
281. See. http:www.poets.org/poet.php/prmPID/191 (web-site of Academy of American Poets) (last
visited April 25, 2006).
282. JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 343 (1988).
283. Among Susan Howe's other major writings are MY EMILY DICKINSON, supra note 3;
SINGULARITIES (1990); and THE MIDNIGHT (2003).
284. HOWE, supra note 39, at overleaf.
285. SUSAN HowE, Scattering as Behavior Toward Risk, in SINGULARITIES, supra note 283, at 61-
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marking these as defining events whose effects on American consciousness
continue to resonate. Assiduously examining texts that are often highly
controlled and not easily accessible, Howe traces all that can be uncovered
from the margins and from the physical records documenting the prosecution of
Anne Hutchinson by her erstwhile friend and minister, John Cotton. Her
searches are determined: tracking down "the marginal," she retrieves omissions
and erasures from "authoritative" texts;286 she documents the telling physical
features of texts that have gone unmentioned in prevailing accounts of the
religious history of the Massachusetts Bay Colony;287 and she uncovers the
"taming" that has limited full access to Emily Dickinson's manuscripts.288 She
tracks and exposes what she sees as a consistent and continuing suppression of
the antinomian in American history. This suppression has often involved the
dominance of religious forces marked by a narrow range of tolerance for the
expression of contradictory (often female-gendered) experience. Howe is
convinced that fear of antinomianism continues to predominate and that
American life and literature are committed to suppressing antinomianism. Her
understanding of the operation of power, as expressed through editorial control
as well as through civil government, persuades her that strongly antinomian
themes will not find prominence or protection in American culture and
American law and that antinomian vision in North America is
gendered feminine.8 9
Howe's work offers, in Resnik's terminology, both different writing and
different readings, and in both of these capacities it exceeds N&N. Some of the
texts and narratives that Howe selects for study are different from the ones
selected by Cover; she fully understands the legal liberalism of her father and
of Robert Cover, but in texts that they found complete and authentic, she finds
gaps and silences. If you are a woman. archives hold perpetual
ironies. Because the gaps and silences are where you find
yourself.290  While Howe inherits the modernist lineage that produced her
286. For example, Howe catalogues the distortions of Dickinson's manuscripts, recording the
"corrections" and omissions she discovers both in the Thomas H. Johnson editions of Dickinson's
writing and in the Ralph Franklin edition of 1986. See HowE, supra note 39, at 131-53.
287. Howe, for example, records a history of "rational corrections" made by editors of the
manuscript of Thomas Shepard, the minister of the Cambridge First Church who prosecuted Anne
Hutchinson. She introduces a counter-history that includes a record of the physical characteristics as
well as the words of Thomas Shepard's unpublished manuscript "autobiography," commenting on the
blank pages, on the lack of margins, and on the inclusion of writings beginning at both ends of the
notebook. Howe wants to demonstrate the distorting effect of reductive edits, which eliminated from
Shepard's text evidence of his religious doubt and uncertainty. HowE, supra note 39, at 43-86.
288. HOWE, supra note 39, at 131-153; see generally HOWE, supra note 3. In her commentary on
Dickinson, Howe insists upon attention to the physicality of the Dickinson manuscripts and to such
realities as the punctuation, spelling, spacing, and length and. angle of dashes inscribed by Dickinson.
She notes the "editorial emendations" perpetrated by Thomas H. Johnson and by R. W. Franklin, in their
editions of Dickinson's work, through which "the subject-creator and her art in its potential gesture were
domesticated and occluded by an assumptive privileged Imperative." HOWE, supra note 39, at 131.
289. HowE, supra note 39, at 4.
290. Talisman Interview, supra note 21, at 158.
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father and Cover, her own work is positioned at the juncture of modernity and
postmodernity. It is unquestionably located in a place from which rtihe
anibiguous paths of kinship pull me in opposite ways at once.
2 9 1
Susan Howe chooses a different ancestry-which, as Cover has told us, "is a
serious business with major implications; '292 she finds a different history-
something that, as Mark DeWolfe Howe has told us, "[ejach of us is entirely
free" to do.293 She seeks out women hard to track down: Genealogical
trace of them has vanished with their surnames.29 4 Her alternative
choices expose gendered constraints on liberty that operate through both law
and religion. Robert Cover worried about judges who colluded with history.
Susan Howe's work attempts to collide with history and to collude with
narratives that have continued to be suppressed (that were suppressed in N&N)
and that continue to be overlooked in legal writing about religion and gender.
295
If Law and Literature is to become energized by different writing, Susan
Howe's work provides a singularly relevant departure point.
Yet, Howe's work of writing also constitutes the kind of different reading
that distinguishes it from N&N and from other texts of legal-liberalism.
Characterized by scholarly rigor as well as by experimentation, Howe's writing
is deeply informed and influenced by postmodernist and deconstructive
perspectives. These attributes push it far beyond the perspectives expressed in
N&N and beyond the bounded perspectives of contemporary legal-liberalism.
It is these perspectives that enable Howe's "un-settling" of the closed narratives
most typically produced by liberal-legal theory, including feminist legal theory
and Law and Literature writings about women, gender, sexuality, and religion.
It has already been suggested that Howe attends to particular
antinomianisms that Cover ignored: those of individuals (often women)
countering the normativity of insular religious groups. But her un-covering is
not limited to an exposure of ignored or suppressed narratives; Howe's work
involves a deeper epistemological venture. Beyond and against the limited
antinomianism of N&N, Howe offers an "unconverted antinomianism," which
may be another name for deconstruction. Unlike Cover, Howe has no interest
in the (even temporary) resolution or settlement of issues that could be
produced by the production of new nomoi that would privilege new narratives.
While legal theory reaches for settlements, Howe wants not to settle, but rather
291. HOWE, supra note 3, at 7.
292. Cover, supra note 1, at 18.
293. HowE, supra note 2, at 5.
294. HOWE, supra note 39, at 67.
295. "Collision or Collusion with history" is a line from one of Susan Howe's poems, collected in
Articulation of Sound Forms in Time, in SINGULARrrITES, supra note 283, at 33. Robert Cover was
centrally concerned with "collusions" of judges. The "process of "judicial complicity" in crimes and
injustice is the topic of JUSTICE ACCUSED. See supra note 25.
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to un-settle, the wilderness.296 This rejection of "settlement" marks the
deconstructive nature of Howe's critique of legal and religious nomianisms; her
privileging of the "wilderness" identifies a non-na've commitment to the search
for something beyond law. [A] dark wall of rule supports the
structure of every letter, record, transcript: every proof of
authority and Rower. I know records are compiled by winners.
and scholarship is in collusion with Civil Government. I know
all this and go on searching .... 297
Howe brings poststructuralist perspectives to many of the issues that
Heilbrun defined as central to contemporary feminist studies, including the
definition of "gender," the definition of "women," and the interpretation of
sexuality. Explicitly identifying the major figures in poststructuralist theory
and deconstruction who have influenced her work, Howe cites Michel Foucault
as the direct inspiration of her writing about Anne Hutchinson. 29  She
identifies Julia Kristeva,299 Luce Irigaray, 300 and Alice Jardine 30 1 as influencing
her understanding of gender. And it should be noted that although Howe's
work focuses predominantly on women suppressed by law and by religion, her
feminism-or, more precisely, her understanding of gender, as informed by
poststructuralist perspectives-appears to escape the essentialism for which
various American legal feminisms of the 1980s and 1990s have been indicted.
When she writes of gender, Howe evidences the postmodernist recognition that
the "gendering" apparent in the suppression of antinomianism does not affect
women alone. In contrast to some forms of feminism and feminist legal theory,
Howe's construction of gender is not inconsistent with the analyses of sexuality
developed by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 3 2 and by Judith Butler.30 3
The issue that Heilbrun called "legitimacy of the personal as women have
begun increasingly to use it in critical studies" 3°4 is advanced in Howe's
writing. It is advanced not by an invocation of the "I" of lyric poetry, but by
Howe's consistent emphasis on the attachment of subjectivity to history.
Rachel 'Blau DuPlessis has characterized Howe's work as "an astonishing self-
portrait of an artist, a woman, trying to inherit herself, to work herself into her
296. "Unsettling the Wilderness of American Literary History" is a central theme of The Birth
Mark. See generally HOWE, supra note 39.
297. Id. at 4.
298. Id. at 37, citing MICHAEL FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED
ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS (Donald Bouchard ed., 1977)
299. Id. at x, citing JULIA KRISTEVA, Semiotics of Biblical Abomination, in POWERS OF HORROR:
AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 90 (1982).
300. Id. at 170, citing LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT ONE (1985).
301. Id., citing JARDINE, supra note 91.
302. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990).
303. See Butler, supra note 17.
304. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 26.
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own-'patrimony'? 'anarchy'? No, into her own 'liberty." ''30 5  Krzysztof
Ziarek has also discussed this impulse toward liberty in Howe's work,
perceiving her as reaching toward an understanding of liberty that goes beyond
"agency ''306 and beyond a "patriarchal model of identity" 30 7 and that is
"opposed to the idea of the subject as the locus of meaning and
intelligibility. '308  Ziarek also identifies the experimental and avant-garde
features of Howe's experimental play with language, defining her work as "part
of the critique of modernity's reliance on forms of thought and discourse which
seek to foreclose the play of possibilities .... ,0 Ziarek identifies what he
sees as deep political implications of Howe's work of de-mythologizing history
and of refusing to offer any alternative "uniform vision of history. 310
In all the respects discussed here, Howe's work undertakes major tasks that
Heilbrun identified as central for future endeavors of Law and Literature. I
have gone beyond Heilbrun to identify the articulation of religion with gender
and law as a key site for the engagement of legal theory. And I think it is here
that Susan Howe's contributions, with their incorporation of postmodernist
perspectives on law, gender, and religion, are particularly important.
Within legal theory, remarkably little attention has been given to law's
reinforcement of religious groups' gender and sexual oppressions. This is the
case in spite of a tradition of critical writing that has been part of American
feminist commentary on American religion from the 19th-century critiques of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Matilda Joslyn Gage to the 21st-century critiques
of Mary Daly. It becomes particularly notable when we consider Carolyn
Heilbrun's observation that the women students in her Law and Literature
classes often expressed intense reactions of both anxiety and anger as they
came to "realization of the ways in which the culture and often the religion in
which [they] grew up were male-centered. 3 12  Feminist legal-theoretical
critiques of religion during the last twenty years or so have been few in number
and they have tended have tended in the direction of modesty. For example, in
her 1985 commentary on Bob Jones University, Judith Miles quite broadly
313criticized the provision of tax-exempt status to any religious group. But in
305. Rachel Blau DuPlessis, "WHOWE": On Susan Howe, http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/authors/
howe/howe duplessis.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
306. ZIAREK, supra note 279, at 287.
307. Id. at 285.
308. Id. at 288.
309. Id. at 289.
310. Id. at276.
311. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, THE WOMAN'S BIBLE (Dover Publications, 2002) (reprint of the
two-volume work originally published in 1895 and 1898); MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE, WOMAN, CHURCH
AND STATE (Ayer Co. Publishers, 1992) (1900); and MARY DALY, AMAZON GRACE: RECALLING THE
COURAGE TO SIN BIG (2006).
312. Heilbrun & Resnik, supra note 6, at 17 (emphasis added).
313. Judith C. Miles, Beyond Bob Jones: Toward the Elimination of Governmental Subsidy of
Discrimination by Religious Institutions, 8 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 31 (1985) (arguing for the elimination
of all governmental subsidies to religion).
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1993, Mary Becker, while echoing Miles' criticism of the IRS practice,
recommended a far more modest remedy than the one proposed by Miles.
314
And neither one of these entirely sound proposals has been pursued in spite of a
national public policy that purports to honor gender equality.
More recently, despite N&N's focus on American religious groups, Judith
Resnik's evaluation of Cover's essay only very indirectly addresses the
patriarchy-enforcing practices of those groups. Resnik highlights the unique
problems associated with sex discrimination in religious and other "paideic
communities" under her exoticized heading "Tribes and Veils."'315  She
concentrates not on the operation of laws currently subsidizing patriarchal
religious institutions across the entire United States, but on the operation of
laws within a Pueblo tribe and in France. 316  This commentary is not
unimportant, but it avoids confrontation with more widely applicable issues of
American law, such as the questions of how law and public policy should
address the reality that, in the United States, the national government is
increasing its financial subsidization of patriarchal religious groups; and how
law and policy should respond to religious groups seeking or claiming an
entitlement to discriminate on the bases of gender and sexual orientation, even
while receiving governmental subsidies. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century, we need more writing examining the intersections of law, religion, and
gender.
At a time of escalating governmental subsidization of patriarchal religious
groups, the implications of governmental support for religious groups that
disparage and suppress women are heightened, and the appropriateness of
consciously gendered commentary on this aspect of church-and-state
interaction is particularly apparent. Yet, at the same time, articulating how law
should relate to religion is also increasingly difficult. Liberalism's
commitment to "toleration" is widely experienced, as Stanley Fish defined it, as
a "mission impossible."
317
In the face of a need for new understandings of "toleration"--
understandings more capacious than legal liberalism's "tolerance"-I believe
318Jacques Derrida's writing about religion to be particularly germane, and Ifind many points of connection between Derrida's and Howe's understandings
314. Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial
Perspective, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 453, 485 (1992) (proposing "banning tax exemptions and postal
subsidies and the award of government contracts to religious organizations that close leadership
positions to women").
315. Resnik, supra note 12, at 47.
316. Id.
317. See Fish, Mission Impossible, supra note 264.
318. Derrida, Faith and Knowledge, supra note 278. For recent commentary on Derrida's
contribution, see Emily Hartigan, Engaged Surrender in the Void: Post-Secularist "Human" Rights
Discourse and Muslim Feminists (paper presented at Workshop on Feminist Legal Theory, "All in the
Family? Islam, Women, and Human Rights," at Emory University School of Law) (March 3-4, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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of religion. An obvious commonality involves their mutual focus on
antinomian voices. Susan Howe's attention to this issue has already been
pointed out. Derrida's was obvious in his remarks at an international
conference on religion in 1994. Commenting on the conferees, Derrida noted
that they were:
Christian, barely even Judaeo-Christian. No Muslim is among us, alas,
even for this preliminary discussion, just at the moment when it is
towards Islam, perhaps, that we ought to begin by turning our
attention. No representative of other cults, either. Not a single
woman!
3' 9
We should have... begun by allowing them to speak.
320
I see, beyond that commonality, a deeper connection between Derrida and
Howe, traceable to their common retention of a faith in language that survives
the loss of other foundations and stabilities. This faith in language permits their
speaking beyond the dimensions of Western liberalism and its binarisms. I
have discussed elsewhere what Derrida discovers as "sources" underlying
thought, and underlying both "faith" and "reason," that he terms either
"messianicity without messianism" or chora.321  Derrida discovers, in the
extremity of his abstraction and "at the limits of reason alone," a condition of
uncertainty, of "indecisive oscillation" that may constitute the only presently
available "chance ... of a new 'tolerance."' 322 I believe that this space of
uncertainty and possibility is similarly approached by Susan Howe. It is the
space of an "unconverted antinomianism"--an antinomianism that remains
unsatisfied, that goes on searching.
Like Derrida, Susan Howe puts her faith in language. And this faith takes
her to the place that Derrida has entered. The Puritans, she posits, though
lawless in their own invasive settlement of New England, could not permit
lawlessness. Law had to be instituted and settled. The "Absolute
Boundary of Reformation" [wasl too immediately unsettling.
3 23
But it is toward the "immediately unsettling" that Howe turns. Her turn and
movement in that direction implies departure from her-and our-lineage of
liberalism. For Howe's father, the Constitution was the sacred text; for Cover,
the sacred texts included both the Constitution and Judaic scripture. For Susan
Howe, I think, as for Derrida, language itself is the "sacred" text. If you
follow the word to a certain extent, you may never come back.324
319. Derrida, Faith and Knowledge, supra note 278, at 5.
320. Id. at 7.
321. Id. at 17-18. See also Ashe, Limits of Tolerance, supra note 57, at 617-618.
322. Derrida, Faith and Knowledge, supra note 278, at 19-20; Ashe, Limits of Tolerance, supra
note 57, at 618-19.
323. HOWE, supra note 39, at 3.
324. Id. at 178.
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Susan Howe pursues language, encountering the "barely legible" and the
"stammer," and she finds in those what Derrida finds in chora: "soundings of
uncertainty." In moving there, she enters a space not discovered by N&N; a
space not recorded in present theorizing about law and gender and religion; a
space traced only rarely and fitfully in Law and Literature.
I think that space is the one we have to enter.
CONCLUSION
My re-reading of Nomos and Narrative has been a major focus of this
Article. Some of us may feel about Robert Cover-I know I do--something
analogous to what Susan Howe feels for her father: I would dearly love to
sit down and show my father what I know now. We would talk
about the garden and the wilderness together, and all would be
well. All manner of things would be well. Yet this place I want to
come home to was false to women in an intellectual sense. It
was false. 325 Re-reading N&N through the critical lenses of Susan Howe's
work, I have tried to show the limits of the liberal-legal project in application to
American law's under-explored intersections with religion and gender. At the
same time, I have sought to introduce Susan Howe's work of "unconverted
antinomianism" to people thinking and writing about legal theory under the
headings of Law and Literature, of feminist legal theory, and of law and
religion. I have done this in the belief that her searching-beyond law, beyond
language, beyond gender, beyond certainty-illuminates the only path of
possibility that I can discern: I ... go on searching for some trace of
love's infolding through all the paper in all the libraries I come
to.
3 26
325. Id. at 161.
326. Id. at 4.
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